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Regulation of the Pharmaceutical-Biotechnology Industry 
 
Introduction 
Pharmaceuticals and human biologic products are regulated in virtually all aspects of the 
product life-cycle: safety, efficacy and manufacturing quality as a condition for market access; 
promotion; and pricing. Since the regulatory structure developed for pharmaceuticals has 
largely been extended to human biologic medicines, we hereafter use “pharmaceuticals” to 
include biologics, and we note explicitly where biologics are treated differently. The rationale 
for heavy regulation of pharmaceuticals is not intrinsic natural monopoly, since any market 
power enjoyed by individual products derives ultimately from government-granted patents. 
Rather, regulation of market access, manufacturing and promotion arise because product 
efficacy and safety can be critical to patient health but are not immediately observable. 
Evaluating safety and efficacy as a condition of market access and monitoring manufacturing 
quality and promotion accuracy over the product life-cycle are public goods that can in theory 
be efficiently provided by an expert agency such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
By contrast, price regulation is best understood as a response by public insurers to the fact that 
insurance makes consumers price-insensitive. When consumers are heavily insured, producers 
of patented products face highly inelastic demand and hence can charge higher prices than they 
would in the absence of insurance. Price regulation and other reimbursement controls are a 
response of government payers to this interaction of insurance and patents. 
Although these considerations suggest that regulation of the pharmaceutical industry is 
potentially welfare enhancing, designing the optimal structure of such regulation is not simple. 
Market access regulation entails both resource costs and foregone patient benefits in terms of   3
fewer drugs and delay of those that do launch. Measuring these costs, designing the optimal 
regulatory structure and finding the best balance between costs and benefits has been the subject 
of both academic research and policy debate and experimentation. Optimal regulation of 
promotion is a relatively recent extension of this debate. On the pricing side, regulation should 
ideally constrain pricing moral hazard while preserving insurance coverage for patients and 
sufficient patent power to assure incentives for appropriate research and development (R&D). 
Much has been learned from the experience with different price regulatory regimes, mostly in 
countries with national health insurance systems. But designing regulatory structures that are 
both theoretically sound and empirically practical remains an important theoretical and policy 
challenge.  
In this paper, Section I describes the technological characteristics of the pharmaceutical 
sector and the primary objectives of regulation.  Sections II provides an overview of safety and 
efficacy regulation in the US and abroad. Section III reviews the empirical evidence, lessons 
learned and proposals for change in safety and efficacy regulation. 
Section IV discusses patents, focusing on those aspects of pharmaceutical patenting that 
interact with regulation, which include patent extension policy, regulation of generic entry, the 
extension of patents to developing countries and affordability concerns.  
Section V describes regulation of pricing, reimbursement and profit; the evidence on 
effects of this regulation; and evidence on industry structure and competition.  Section VI 
summarizes evidence on pharmaceutical promotion, focusing mainly on direct to consumer 
advertising (DTCA), which has become far more important over the last decade, following 
changes in regulatory oversight that remain contentious and unsettled. The final section 
concludes on lessons learned and areas for future research.    4
I. Technological Background and Objectives of Regulation  
The pharmaceutical industry is characterized by unusually high costs of R&D. The US 
research-based industry invests about 17 percent of sales in R&D, and the R&D cost of bringing 
a new compound to market was estimated at $802m. in 2001, an increase from $138m. in the 
1970s and $318m. in the 1990s (DiMasi et al. 2003). This high cost per new drug approved 
reflects high costs of pre-clinical testing and human clinical trials, high failure rates and the 
opportunity cost of capital tied up during the 8-12 years of development. To some extent, this 
high and rising cost of R&D reflects regulations that exist in all industrialized countries, 
requiring that new compounds meet standards of safety, efficacy and manufacturing quality as a 
condition of market access. The main initial focus of regulation since the 1930s was safety, and 
this has reemerged recently as a critical issue. Since the 1960s most countries also require pre-
approval evidence of efficacy, monitor manufacturing quality throughout the product life, and 
regulate promotion and advertising to physicians and consumers.   
  The economic rationale for these requirements derives from the fact that the risks of 
benefits of pharmaceuticals are non-obvious, can differ across patients, and can only be known 
from controlled studies in large patient populations. Gathering and evaluating such information 
is a public good, and a regulatory agency that has both medical and statistical expertise can 
more accurately and efficiently monitor and evaluate the evidence from clinical trials than can 
individual physicians or patients. However, regulation that requires extensive pre-launch 
clinical trial data on safety and efficacy increases the R&D costs incurred by firms, increases 
delay in launch of new medicines, and may reduce the number of drugs developed and the 
extent of competition. The size and duration of clinical trials required to detect remote risks or 
cumulative risks from long term therapies can be large. The rising costs of R&D, combined   5
with new technologies for evaluating information, have prompted recent initiatives to accelerate 
approvals and optimally integrate evidence from pre-approval clinical trials with post-approval 
observational experience.  In the US, the statutory regulation of pharmaceuticals through the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is in addition to – and uncoordinated with -- the 
increasing level of indirect regulation through tort liability. Critical unresolved issues in market 
access regulation are: (1) how much information on risks and benefits should be required prior 
to launch; (2) what is the appropriate trade-off between benefits and risks, given that some risks 
are inevitable; and (3) what is the appropriate mix of pre- and post-launch monitoring of risks, 
what methods should be used, and what is the appropriate mix of regulation by an expert 
agency (such as the FDA or an independent agency) and tort liability? 
A second important characteristic of the pharmaceutical industry is the critical role of 
patents, which results from its research intensity. Given the cost structure with high, globally 
joint fixed costs of R&D and low marginal costs of production, patents are essential to enable 
innovator firms to recoup their R&D investments. However, patents work by enabling innovator 
firms to charge prices above marginal cost, which raises issues of appropriate levels of prices 
and profits and appropriate structure and duration of patents. Concern that prices may be 
excessive is one rationale for price regulation in many countries (although, as discussed below, 
insurance coverage is probably an equally important determinant of pricing decisions).The 
regulatory criteria for admitting post-patent generic entrants is a contentious issue, even for 
traditional chemical compounds. More complex and yet to be resolved by regulatory agencies 
are the conditions for approving “biogenerics”, that is, alternative versions of large molecule, 
biotechnology products such as proteins, monoclonal antibodies etc. As the number and 
utilization of these expensive biologics expand, so does concern to establish a low-cost   6
regulatory path for approval of generic biologics without full scale clinical trials, in order to 
stimulate post-patent price competition.  
The global nature of pharmaceutical products has also raised contentious questions over 
optimal patent regimes in developing countries and cross-nationally. The WTO’s Agreement on 
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requires all member countries to 
recognize 20 year product patents by 2015. However, in response to concern that patents would 
make drugs unaffordable in low income countries, TRIPS permits member states to issue 
compulsory licenses in the event of a “national emergency.” TRIPS also leaves decisions on 
parallel imports to the discretion of individual member states. In most industrialized countries 
including the US, the traditional rule has been national exhaustion of patent rights, which means 
that a patent holders can bar the unauthorized importation of the patented product (parallel 
trade) from other countries. Proposals in the US to legalize parallel trade, including drug 
importation by mass wholesalers, would undermine the traditional rule of national exhaustion of 
patent rights. If enacted, this would undermine manufacturers’ ability to price discriminate 
between countries, which could have serious welfare consequences as discussed below. 
A third characteristic of the pharmaceutical industry is the dominant role of third party 
payment through social and private health insurance. Like any insurance, third party payment 
for drugs creates moral hazard, with incentives for consumers to overuse and/or use 
unnecessarily expensive drugs. In addition, by making demand less elastic, insurance creates 
incentives for firms to charge higher prices than they would in the absence of insurance. In 
response to these insurance-induced distortions, since the 1980s government-run health systems 
in most countries have adopted elaborate regulatory systems to control pharmaceutical 
expenditures, through regulation of manufacturer prices or reimbursement, limits on rate of   7
return on capital, on total drug spending or on company revenues. Private insurers in the US 
also use formularies of covered drugs, co-payments and negotiated prices, but because these 
private insurers must compete for market share, their controls lack the leverage of public payer 
controls. The controls adopted by both public and private insurers have significant effects on 
demand for pharmaceuticals, on the nature of competition and hence on profitability, incentives 
for R&D and the supply of new medicines.  
Because pharmaceuticals are potentially global products and R&D incentives depend on 
expected global revenues, national regulators face free rider incentives. Each country faces a 
short run incentive to adopt regulatory policies that drive its domestic prices to country-specific 
marginal cost, free riding on others to pay for the joint costs of R&D. But if all countries pay 
only their country-specific marginal cost, R&D cannot be sustained. The global nature of 
pharmaceuticals and the long R&D lead times – roughly 12 years from drug discovery to 
product approval, on average – make the incentives for short run free riding by individual 
countries particularly acute. While there is widespread consensus in support of differential 
pricing between the richest and poorest nations, no consensus exists on appropriate price levels 
for these countries or between high and middle-income countries. In practice, the ability of 
pharmaceutical firms to price discriminate is diminishing as more countries adopt national price 
regulatory policies that reference prices in other countries and/or legalize drug importation (also 
called parallel trade or international exhaustion of patent rights). These cross-national price 
spillovers in turn create incentives for firms to delay or not launch new drugs in low price 
markets, if these low prices would undermine potentially higher prices in other markets. Thus 
the design of each country’s price regulatory system can affect not only their domestic   8
availability of drugs but also availability in other countries through price spillovers in the short 
run, and through R&D incentives in the long run.  
Unlike some other industries, regulation of the pharmaceutical industry has not 
diminished or undergone fundamental changes over recent decades, although focus of market 
access regulation has shifted between concerns for safety vs. cost and delays, and the structure 
of price/profit regulation has become more complex. The motivations for regulation of 
pharmaceuticals -- imperfect and/or asymmetric information for market access regulation, 
patents and insurance-related moral hazard for price/profit regulation – remain and have, if 
anything, increased over time. These are summarized in Table 1. Regulatory trends over time 
within the US and cross-national differences provide a wealth of useful experience from which 
some lessons can be learned. This review will focus primarily on US issues and evidence, 
reflecting the dominance of US-based literature. Moreover, US regulatory policy has a 
disproportionately large effect on the industry, because the US market accounts for almost fifty 
percent of global pharmaceutical revenues. However, we draw extensively on experience from 
other countries for evidence on price and reimbursement regulation, cross-national spillover 
effects and access to pharmaceuticals in developing countries.  
Insert Table 1 here 
The appropriate economic model of the pharmaceutical industry is either monopolistic 
competition or oligopoly with product differentiation. However, both positive and normative 
analysis must also take into account the roles of physician prescribing and third party payment 
as key factors is demand elasticities and cross-price elasticities. Moreover, models of optimal 
pricing must recognize the importance of R&D and fixed costs. In this context, welfare 
conclusions about optimal levels of R&D, product variety or drug use are problematic. Most   9
analysis to date and most of our discussion are therefore positive rather than normative.  
Although the industry is characterized by high fixed costs, models in which firms endogenously 
choose sunk costs, either in the form R&D or promotion to retain competitive advantage and 
deter competition / entry (Sutton, 1991), do not seem appropriate and appear to be clearly 
refuted by the evidence of entry over the last two decades by thousands of small firms. We 
return to this below. 
   
II. Overview of Safety and Efficacy Regulation  
1. The US 
The first comprehensive federal legislation regulating food and drugs in the US was the 
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 (The Wiley Act) which required that product labels and 
packaging not contain false statements about curative effects, but stopped short of requiring 
manufacturers to provide evidence to prove safety or efficacy (Palumbo, 2002).  The 1938 
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), which replaced the Wiley Act, required any firm 
seeking to market a new chemical entity (NCE) to file a new drug application (NDA) to 
demonstrate that the drug was safe for use as suggested by the proposed labeling. The Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) had 180 days to reject the NDA.  As new forms of print and radio 
advertising had emerged since the Wiley Act, the FDCA established jurisdiction over drug 
advertising, but policing was left to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rather than the FDA. 
This Act also established the requirement that patients obtain a prescription from a physician in 
order to obtain retail drugs.  
The 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the 1938 FDCA were the outcome of 
hearings that were initiated due to concern over the proliferation, pricing and advertising of   10
drugs of dubious efficacy. The final legislation also reflected concern to strengthen safety 
requirements, following the thalidomide tragedy that caused hundreds of birth defects in Europe 
whereas the drug was still under review in the US. The 1962 Amendments define the 
regulations that largely still operate today. They strengthened safety requirements; added the 
requirement that drugs show proof of efficacy, usually by double blind, randomized controlled 
trials of the drug relative to placebo; removed the time limit (previously 180 days) within which 
the FDA could reject an NDA; extended FDA regulation to cover clinical testing and 
manufacturing; and restricted manufacturers’ promotion to approved indications. Basic 
requirements for promotional materials were defined, including that such materials cannot be 
false or misleading; they must provide a fair balance of risks and benefits; and they must 
provide a “brief summary” of contraindications, side effects and effectiveness. Regulatory 
oversight of promotional material was ceded back to the FDA from the FTC.   
The presumption underlying the requirement for proof of efficacy was that imperfect 
and possibly asymmetric information prevented physicians and consumers from making 
accurate evaluations, leading to wasted expenditures on ineffective drugs and other associated 
costs, and excessive product differentiation that undermined price competition. Although Phase 
III trials, involving double-blinded, randomized placebo-controlled trials in large patient 
populations, were initially intended to establish efficacy, over time these trial requirements have 
been expanded to detect remote risks and/or cumulative treatment risks of chronic medications. 
The size and duration of clinical trials, together with increased regulatory review time, added to 
delay in the launch of new drugs, leading to foregone benefits for consumers, shorter effective 
patent life and foregone revenue for firms, albeit with the intent of avoiding potentially larger 
costs for consumers.
 1  Moreover, since some regulatory costs are fixed, independent of   11
potential market size, such regulation raises the expected revenue threshold required to break 
even on a new drug, leading to higher break-even prices, ceteris paribus, and fewer drugs, 
particularly drugs to treat rare diseases with small potential market size.  
Subsequent legislation has addressed several of these cost-increasing effects of the 1962 
Amendments. The Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (ODA) significantly increased incentives to invest 
in orphan diseases (defined as conditions that affect less than 200,000 individuals in the US) by 
increasing revenues and decreasing costs: drugs that receive orphan status are granted market 
exclusivity for seven years (that is, similar compounds will not be approved to treat the same 
condition) and receive a 50% tax credit for expenses accrued through clinical testing. Orphan 
drugs may also benefit from research grants from the NIH and accelerated or Fast Track FDA 
approval (see below). Following the ODA, the number of orphan drug approvals has increased 
significantly.  Between 1979 and 1983, orphan drug approvals increased at approximately the 
same rate as other drugs.  However by 1998, there were more than five times as many orphan 
drugs as in 1979, but fewer than twice as many non-orphan drugs (Lichtenberg and Waldfogel, 
2003). 
An important initiative to reduce delay in the FDA review of regulatory filings was the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) of 1993.
2 Under PDUFA, pharmaceutical firms agree 
to pay substantial user fees to enable the FDA to hire more reviewers and hence expedite drug 
review.
3 In fiscal year 2004, the $251 million in fees accounted for 53% of total processing 
costs at the FDA (FDA 2005d). In addition to user fees, the PDUFA created a system that 
classifies new drug applications that target unmet medical needs as “priority review”, as 
opposed to “standard review”, with target duration of 10 months for standard review and 6   12
months for priority review drugs. Prior to 1992, the FDA classified drugs into either A,B or C 
categories, and an AA category was developed to speed the review of AIDS products.   
  The 1997 FDA Modernization Act (FDAMA) renewed the priority review system and 
created Fast Track status to potentially expedite the entire clinical trial process for novel drugs 
(FDA 2005b), by additional meetings, correspondence and review programs with the FDA.  
Products may receive fast track designation if they are “intended for the treatment of a serious 
or life-threatening condition” and “demonstrate the potential to address unmet medical needs 
for the condition”(FDA 1997; FDA 2004b).  In addition, “Accelerated Approval” status refers 
to FDA acceptance of approval on the basis of a surrogate endpoint that “is reasonably likely to 
predict clinical benefit” rather than a clinical benefit.  Accelerated approval is one of the 
potential review processes for which fast track drugs may qualify.  Fast track has reduced 
overall development times by approximately 2.5 years (Tufts Center for the Study of Drug 
Development (2003)), but some have argued that fast track and priority review are associated 
with increased prevalence of post-approval adverse events (see below).  
The increased time taken by clinical trials and regulatory review not only increases the 
out-of-pocket cost of R&D but also reduces effective patent life. To address this, the 1984 
Patent Term Restoration and Competition Act (hereafter the Hatch-Waxman Act) granted 
innovator firms an extension of patent term for up to five years.
4 However, as a quid pro quo, 
the 1984 Act expedited post-patent entry by generic manufacturers. Specifically, generic 
manufacturers are permitted to work on the active ingredient before the patent expiry (the Bolar 
exemption) and generics can be approved with an Accelerated New Drug Application (ANDA), 
which requires only that the generic prove bioequivalence and chemical equivalence to the 
originator product, without new safety and efficacy trials.  Hatch-Waxman conferred a five year   13
maximum data exclusivity period after the innovator’s NDA approval (three years for other data 
not submitted in support of an NCE approval), after which generic firms are free to use 
innovator clinical trial data to prepare their ANDA (the EU allows 10 years of data exclusivity) 
(Kuhlik, 2004). Moreover, Hatch-Waxman grants to the first generic firm to successfully 
challenge a patent (a paragraph IV filing) 180 days as the exclusive ANDA-approved generic in 
the market, after the originator’s patent expiry (Kuhlik, 2004).   In recent years, originator firms 
have been accused of  “evergreening” their drugs by late filing of follow-on patents on minor 
aspects of the compound; excessively litigating challenges to patents; entering collusive 
agreements with generic manufacturers; and developing follow-on products that resemble that 
original product except for minor changes that nevertheless may suffice for a new patent e.g. 
single isomer versions. The FTC has taken antitrust enforcement action against agreements 
between originator and generic firms to delay the launch of generics (FTC, 2002). The 2003 
Medicare Modernization Act includes changes to deter these practices, but this remains an 
unsettled area.  
  The Hatch-Waxman Act laid the necessary foundation for fast and cheap generic entry 
immediately after patent expiry in the US. Generics account for over 50 percent of prescriptions 
filled, compared to 19 percent in 1984 when Hatch-Waxman was enacted (FTC, 2002); but 
generics account of only about 10 percent of drug expenditures, reflecting their low prices. 
However, the rapid and comprehensive generic erosion of originator market shares that now 
occurs also reflects state-level legislation authorizing pharmacists to substitute generics for 
originator drugs (unless the physician notes “brand required”) and insurance reimbursement 
incentives to pharmacies and patients to accept generic substitution (see section V). The speed 
of generic entry, generic market shares and prices differ significantly across countries,   14
reflecting regulatory differences in market access and in reimbursement incentives for 
pharmacists and patients (Danzon and Furukawa, 2003). Empirical evidence related to Hatch-
Waxman as well as cross-national differences are discussed below.   
The FDAMA also initiated significant change in promotion regulation, by permitting 
companies to inform physicians of potential unapproved (“off-label”) uses of drugs through the 
distribution of peer reviewed journals. It also permitted companies to issue economic analyses 
to payers, provided that the analysis “shall not be considered to be false or misleading…the 
health care economic information directly relates to an [approved] indication…and is based on 
competent and reliable scientific evidence”(FDA 1997). 
The regulations governing direct to consumer advertising (DTCA) were subject to 
revised interpretation in an FDA Draft Guidance issued in 1997. Previously, product claim 
advertisements that named both the drug and the condition it treated were required to disclose 
all the risks and contraindications within the content of the advertisement (Wilkes, Bell et al., 
2000).  The 1997 FDA guidance still required firms to present a “fair balance” between risks 
and benefits and not mislead with false advertising; however, broadcast ads could meet the 
requirement for disclosure by providing several other sources to obtain the full label, including 
a toll-free number, an internet site, a print ad or a “see your physician” advice (US GAO 
2002a).  The 1997 draft guidance (formalized in 1999) stimulated the growth of DTCA, 
especially broadcast ads. Total DTCA spending grew from $266m. in 1994 to $2.47b. in 2000, 
while spending on television advertising increased from $36m. to $1.57b. over the same time 
period.  
 
   15
2. Other Industrialized Countries 
Each country has its own drug approval process, although in practice smaller countries 
frequently review and reference approvals granted by other major agencies such as the US FDA 
or the European Medicines Agency (EMEA). Following the thalidomide tragedy and the 
strengthening of safety and efficacy requirements in the US in 1962, the UK tightened safety 
regulations in 1964 and added efficacy requirements in 1971. Other industrialized countries 
adopted similar regulations, although some, such as France and Japan, have less stringent 
efficacy requirements (Thomas, 1996).  
In 1995 the European Union established the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) as a 
centralized approach to drug approval for EU member states. The EMEA offers two tracks to 
drug approval. The centralized procedure involves review by the EMEA and provides 
simultaneous approval of the drug in all countries of the EU. Alternatively, a firm can use the 
mutual recognition approach, seeking approval by one rapporteur country with reciprocity in 
other EU countries, subject to their review and objection. The EMEA is the required approval 
route for biotech products and is optional for other new drugs. National systems remain for 
products that seek approval in only a few countries.  
Since the 1990s the regulatory authorities and the industry in the three major 
pharmaceutical markets – the US, the EU and Japan – have worked through the International 
Commission on Harmonization (ICH) to harmonize their regulatory requirements for safety, 
efficacy and manufacturing quality.  As a result of the harmonization measures, companies can, 
to a significant degree, compile a single dossier for submission to the EMEA, the US FDA and 
Japan.  However, some important differences in regulatory requirements remain and each 
agency still makes its own evaluation based on their own risk-benefit trade-off. For example,   16
the EMEA typically requires trials of new drugs relative to current treatment whereas the FDA 
more often uses a placebo comparator, except where use of placebo would imply unethical 
treatment of patients. Japan still requires some trials on Japanese nationals.   
The EMEA and the UK Medicines Agency have adopted user fee programs to expedite 
review, and the EMEA has adopted an Orphan Drug Law. As a result of harmonization and 
other measures, differences in market approval requirements are no longer a major source of 
difference in timing of drug launch between the US and “free pricing” countries in the EU, 
notably the UK and Germany (until 2004). Larger differences remain in the approval process 
for generics. Measures similar to the US Hatch-Waxman provisions have been proposed for the 
EU but so far have not been adopted by the EMEA or by all EU countries’ national regulatory 
agencies. 
 
3. Developing Countries 
More problematic is the appropriate regulatory agency and standards for drugs intended 
primarily for use in developing countries. Since disease incidence, competing risks, costs and 
benefits of treatment may be vastly different in these countries, decisions based on FDA or 
EMEA risk-benefit trade-offs may be inappropriate. For example, in 1999 Wyeth withdrew its 
rotavirus vaccine, Rotashield, from the US market due to concern that the risk of severe (but 
infrequent) intussuception would be unacceptable relative to the vaccine’s benefit, given the 
relatively low risks from rotavirus in the US. The vaccine became unavailable in developing 
countries, which expressed no interest in using it, although their benefit-risk ratio would have 
been very different, given their much higher incidence and higher death rates from rotavirus 
(Hausdorff, W. 2002).    17
More generally, if willingness to pay high R&D and delay costs in order to reduce drug 
risks is income elastic, then requiring that drugs targeted at developing countries meet the 
standards of the FDA/EMEA may impose inappropriately high regulatory costs in developing 
countries. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence indicates that the developing countries 
themselves are unwilling to accept drugs that are not approved for marketing in the US or the 
EU. Moreover, inappropriately high costs of regulatory compliance are probably less important 
than low potential revenues in discouraging R&D for drugs to treat diseases prevalent only or 
predominantly in less developed countries, such as malaria, TB or leischmaniasis. Various 
“push” and “pull” subsidy mechanisms have been proposed and some have been implemented, 
to increase financial incentives for investment in these LDC-only drugs (see, for example, 
Kremer (2002); Mahmoud et al. (2006).  Ridley et al. (2006) propose a transferable voucher for 
accelerated review by the FDA that could be used for any other product. While this might be 
politically more feasible than a subsidy financed by a broader tax, the efficiency and 
distributional consequences could be less desirable.  
 
III. Effects of Safety and Efficacy Regulations: Evidence and Issues 
1. Costs of Regulation  
Much of the early economic analysis of pharmaceutical regulation focused on effects of 
the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments on R&D costs, delays in launch of new drugs, decline 
in the number of new drug introductions and changes in industry structure that occurred in the 
1960s and 1970s, raising questions of causation (for example, Peltzman, 1973; Grabowski, 
Vernon  et al., 1978; Baily, 1972; Wiggins, 1981).    18
  Number of new drug launches   Grabowski, Vernon et al. (1978) report that the 
number of NCEs fell from 233 in the five-year period 1957-1961 to 93 in 1962-1966 and 76 in 
1967-1971.  Some decline would be consistent with the intent of the legislation, if some of the 
prior introductions were ineffective. However, the percentage of total ethical drug sales 
accounted for by new NCEs declined roughly in proportion to the number of drugs, from 20.0 
percent in 1957-1961 to 5.5 percent in 1967-1971. The authors contend that this finding is 
inconsistent with the argument that only the most insignificant drugs were eliminated.
5  
Grabowski et al. also attempt to measure the marginal reduction plausibly attributed to 
the 1962 Amendments after controlling for other possible contributing factors, including the 
depletion of new product opportunities; the thalidomide tragedy that may have made 
manufacturers and physicians more risk averse, hence reduced demand for new drugs; and 
pharmacological advances that may have raised R&D costs independent of regulation.  They 
compared trends in NCE discoveries in the US relative to the UK, an appropriate comparator 
country because of its strong and successful research-based pharmaceutical industry. This is a 
quasi-natural experiment since the UK did not adopt efficacy requirements until 1971 and its 
1963 safety requirements were statistically unrelated to the flow of new discoveries. Grabowski 
et al. find that research productivity, defined as number of NCEs per (lagged) R&D 
expenditure, declined sixfold between 1960-61 and 1966-1970 in the US, compared to a 
threefold decline in the UK, and that the 1962 Amendments increased the cost per new NCE in 
the US by a factor of 2.3. They conclude that these differentials are plausibly attributable to 
regulation, since the UK would have been equally affected by exogenous changes in scientific 
opportunities and testing norms and by any thalidomide-related change in demand. In fact, these 
estimates based on using the UK as a benchmark are probably conservative estimate because   19
regulatory changes in the US, as the largest single pharmaceutical market, would influence 
incentives for innovative R&D for all firms, regardless of country of domicile, and hence could 
have contributed to the decline in NCE discoveries in the UK. 
R&D Cost per NCE     There is little doubt that regulation has contributed to the 
increase in R&D cost per new drug approved, but the relative contribution of regulation vs. 
other factors is uncertain. Baily (1972) and Wiggins (1981) concluded that the 1962 
Amendments led to a large increase in the R&D cost per new drug approved, but with 
significant variation across therapeutic categories. More recent evidence shows that the cost of 
developing new drugs has continued to outpace the CPI, despite no major change in explicit 
regulatory requirements, although undocumented changes in regulatory requirements may have 
occurred. DiMasi et al. (2003) found that capitalized cost per approved NCE, measured in 
present value at launch, grew from $138M in the 1970s to $318M in the 1980s and $802M in 
the 1990s. Roughly half of this total cost is out-of-pocket expense, including spending on drugs 
that ultimately fail; the remainder is foregone interest or opportunity cost of capital. The 
inflation-adjusted rate of growth of out-of-pocket costs has remained relatively constant (7.0% 
1970-1980, 7.6% 1980-1990).  Interestingly, despite – or because of – the major advances and 
investments in microbiology, combinatorial chemistry, high-throughput screening, robotics, 
bioinformatics, and genomics, that revolutionized drug discovery in the 1980s and 1990s, pre-
clinical costs related to drug discovery have grown at a slower annual rate (2.3% in the 1990s) 
than the costs of clinical trials (11.8%) which reflect shifts in medical care technologies, rather 
than drug discovery technologies. The clinical cost growth rate in the 1990s includes an 
increase in number of trial participants, more procedures and higher cost per participant, the 
latter partly reflecting new medical care technologies. 
6  Besides changing regulatory   20
requirements, other contributing factors include: change in types of drugs and diseases pursued, 
as R&D effort shifts towards more difficult diseases once the “low hanging” diseases have been 
addressed; increased focus on chronic diseases which require longer trials to detect cumulative 
effects; collection of economic as well as clinical data, to satisfy growing payer demands for 
evidence of cost-effectiveness; and possibly growing public demand for safety that might lead 
firms to invest voluntarily in larger/longer trials in order to detect rare effects.   
For certain types of drugs, particularly those used by large populations of relatively 
healthy subjects, such as vaccines, reluctance to tolerate even remote risks is increasing the size 
and duration of trials in order to detect very rare adverse events. For example, recent trials for 
the rotovirus vaccine involve 70,000 patients. In a qualitative survey Coleman et al. (2005) 
report that vaccine manufacturers attribute vaccine shortages and reduced incentives for 
discovery, in part, to the high safety standards that are required by the FDA.
7 Danzon et al. 
(2005c) show that both regulatory requirements and competition have contributed to exit of 
vaccine manufacturers.  
On the other hand, regulatory changes (such as use of biomarkers rather than survival as 
the endpoints, Fast Track status etc.) which expedite drugs that treat life-threatening diseases 
for which no effective therapies exist have no doubt reduced costs and delay, contributing to the 
recent dramatic growth in number of drugs approved and in development for cancer, 
inflammatory diseases etc. in recent years. Other factors such as advances in science and 
relatively generous reimbursement under Medicare Part B have also contributed to the 
proliferation of R&D, particularly biologics for these high priority conditions, making it hard to 
identify the net effect of regulatory changes on R&D. However, it seems safe to conclude that, 
given PDUFA, FDAMA and other measures that have been adopted to expedite trials and   21
review for high priority drugs, the balance has shifted and there is now less concern over undue 
costs and delay at least for these high priority drugs, and perhaps more concern over adequate 
proof of safety and efficacy.  
Lags in Launch     Several analyses find that the 1962 Amendments 
increased delay in launch of new drugs in the US relative to other countries (for example, 
Wardell (1973); Wardell and Lasagna (1975); Grabowski and Vernon (1978); Grabowski 
(1976); Wiggins (1981)). Grabowski and Vernon (1978) compare introduction dates in the US 
and the UK for drugs discovered in the US between 1960 and 1974. The proportion of drugs 
introduced first in the US declined significantly between 1960-1962 and 1972-1974, while the 
proportion introduced later in the US increasing significantly. The authors conclude that 
increased regulatory scrutiny in the US caused multinational companies to introduce new 
products abroad before their US launch. Similarly, Grabowski (1976) finds that many more 
drugs were introduced first in Europe despite most being discovered in the US or by US-based 
firms.  Dranove and Meltzer (1994) estimate that the average time from a drug’s first worldwide 
patent application to its approval by the FDA rose from 3.5 years in the 1950s to almost 6 years 
in the 1960s and 14 years in the mid 1980. They also found that, beginning in the 1950s, more 
important drugs - especially drugs that proved to be successful in the marketplace - have been 
developed and approved more rapidly than less important drugs. They attribute this differential 
to actions of drug companies as much as to regulatory priority setting.
8  
However, evidence from the 1990s indicates that the US no longer lags and may lead the 
major EU markets in number and timing of major new drug launches (Danzon, Wang and 
Wang, 2005). Given the coordination of standards and similarity of regulatory requirements in 
the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) and the US FDA, differences in launch timing   22
between the US and the EU appear to be driven less by differences in market approval 
requirements and more by price and reimbursement regulation in the EU, including the fact that 
price spillovers create incentives for manufacturers to intentionally delay launch in low-price 
markets. One exception is Japan which has relatively high launch prices and unusually long 
launch lags due to its unique market approval requirements, including country-specific trials.  
 
2. Benefits of Safety and Efficacy Regulation    
Compared to costs, there are many fewer studies of the benefits to consumers from 
regulation. The only significant attempt to weigh both the benefits and costs of the 1962 
Amendments is Peltzman’s (1973) study. He attempts to measure the benefit associated with the 
new efficacy standards by comparing the growth of market shares of drugs launched prior to 
1962 to those launched after 1962. The assumption was that new products would capture 
greater initial market share after 1962 if the Amendments increased the average efficacy of new 
drugs relative to drugs already on the market (Peltzman 1973).  He concludes that the benefits 
were minimal and were far outweighed by the costs of regulation, which he estimates as 
foregone consumer surplus due to the reduced flow of NCEs.  These conclusions depend 
critically on the methods for estimating costs and benefits, which have been questioned (for 
example, Temin (1979)). In particular, benefits may be understated and costs may be overstated 
by ascribing the decline in NCEs solely to the regulation. Nevertheless, this is an important 
study because it offers a theoretical and empirical framework for evaluating the net benefits of 
the 1962 efficacy requirements.   
Several recent studies have examined the benefits and costs of the priority review policy 
introduced by PDUFA in 1992.  Undoubtedly, PDUFA expedited the time to market for   23
“priority” drugs.  Between 1993 and 2003 the median time to approval declined from 14.9 to 
6.7 months, while review times for “standard” products only decreased from 27.2 to 23.1 
months (Okie, 2005).  Olson (2000) uses data from 1990-92 and 1992-95 to examine the 
difference in the effects of firm characteristics on review times before and after the 1992 
PDUFA.  She finds that firm characteristics were not associated with review times after 1992, 
suggesting that the regulatory change helped eliminate firm advantages that existed prior to 
1992.  PDUFA was also subsequently amended to reduce filing fees for smaller firms.  
 Olson (2004a) also attempts to quantify the safety impact of PDUFA and compare the 
costs of faster approvals to the benefits.  She finds that post-launch reports of adverse drug 
reactions (ADRs) are more likely for drugs that the FDA rates as “priority”, after controlling for 
drug utilization, disease characteristics, patient characteristics, drug review time and year 
specific effects. Controlling for these factors, she concludes that there are 60-84% more serious 
ADRs, 45-72% more ADRs that result in hospitalization and 61-83% more ADRs that result in 
death due to PDUFA.  In order calculate benefits from reduced delay, Olson uses Lichtenberg’s 
estimate of how the increase in the stock of priority review drugs for particular therapeutic 
categories increased life expectancy for persons with those conditions (Lichtenberg, 2002).  She 
finds that under the most conservative assumptions (biasing against safety) the safety impact 
reduces net benefit by just 8% (measured in expected gain in life years).  A large share of the 
benefit is attributed to the faster launch of new drugs with priority review status.  This figure 
increases to 11% if ADRs are under-reported by 30%.  Subsequent research has found that 
ADRs gathered through the FDA post-marketing surveillance mechanisms generally 
underreport ADRs, but the degree is not well established (Brewer and Colditz, 1999; Bennett, 
Nebeker et al. 2005).   Whereas Olson finds significant negative safety effects of accelerated   24
review, the General Accounting Office (US GAO, 2002b) found that drug withdrawals rates 
differed insignificantly between the period before and after the PDUFA; however, this study did 
not control for other factors that may have influenced drug withdrawals rates.  
None of these studies estimate the savings to firms from accelerating the R&D process, 
including lower capitalized costs of R&D and increased effective patent life. DiMasi (2002) 
estimates that a 25 percent reduction in phase length for all phases of clinical trials would 
reduce the average cost per NCE by $129M, or by 16.1% assuming a base cost of $802M. Since 
this estimate is based on a random sample of 68 drugs that entered clinical trials between 1983 
and 1994, it probably overstates the dollar savings for the types of drugs that receive fast track 
status, however the percentage effect may be valid.  
 
3. Discussion and Proposals for Change in Regulation of Safety and Efficacy  
Despite the reduction in regulatory review times under PDUFA, total R&D time remains 
high primarily due to duration of Phase III trials.
9 Concern to reduce launch delay without 
sacrificing risk information has led to growing interest in supplementing pre-launch randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs)  with post-launch observational evidence, from either controlled or 
uncontrolled studies. Advances in data collection from routine care and in statistical methods 
for analyzing such data to adjust for possible nonrandom assignment of patients to different 
treatments offer a potentially rich and relatively cheap source of information that could 
supplement clinical trial data, providing larger sample sizes, detail on subpopulations and 
evidence on long term effects. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) is undertaking 
such studies in order to evaluate effectiveness of alternative treatment regimens for the 
Medicare Drug Benefit. Integrating such findings with FDA’s pre-launch data from RCTs could   25
significantly enhance the information base available for post-launch decisions – for example, on 
labeling changes by the FDA and/or reimbursement decisions by CMS --  and could potentially 
affect the relative role of the FDA vs. CMS.   
The net benefit to consumers from a shift towards earlier approval of drugs based on 
biomarkers (such as tumor shrinkage) depends in part on whether post-launch studies are in fact 
completed, in order to validate that biomarker results are predictive of longer term efficacy in 
clinical outcomes (such as survival) and safety. An FDA survey as of September 30, 2005 
reports 1,552 post-approval studies assigned to industry that have not been completed, of which 
59% have not been started (FDA, 2005e).  Details were not reported on when the follow up 
studies were initially requested or the firms involved. This limited evidence suggests that the 
optimal mix of pre- and post-launch monitoring will depend on political will for enforcement as 
well as statistical feasibility. 
Although models of producer vs. consumer capture are no doubt relevant to 
understanding the regulation of pharmaceuticals, current events and crisis also play a major role 
in the shifting emphasis between safety and speed to market. For example, public and 
Congressional concerns focused on speeding up access to new drugs in the 1980s and 1990s, 
partly in response to the AIDS crisis. More recently, post-launch evidence on risks of some 
widely used drugs, including the COX-2 inhibitors for arthritis and pain, notably rofecoxib 
(Vioxx) and valdecoxib (Bextra), and the SNRI anti-depressants, have led to a range of 
proposals to enhance regulatory protection of safety. The FDA’s expanded MedWatch program 
reports adverse events on an FDA website as soon as reported (Longman, 2005; FDA 2005c), 
enabling consumers to draw their own conclusions. In February 2005 the FDA created a Drug 
Safety Oversight Board (DSOB) to review safety issues on approved drugs.  Critics argue that   26
such an effective oversight board should be independent of the FDA, as the approving agency, 
and/or that the FDA is captured by industry (Okie, 2005).  Counter arguments are that co-
ordination within the FDA of pre-launch review and post-launch monitoring permits greater 
consistency in decision-making and takes advantage of expertise and economies of scale in 
reviewing data. Others have called for requiring public disclosure of results from all industry 
supported clinical trials. Some journals have made public release a condition of publishing 
results, and some firms have voluntarily committed to release data (Longman, 2005).  These 
policies should increase the information available to physicians and patients. On the other hand, 
increased risk of post-launch regulatory review, possibly by an agency using different risk-
benefit criteria than the FDA, would increase post-launch risk for firms and could reduce 
incentives to invest in drugs with novel mechanisms or for new targets.  
Some argue that drugs should be available for prescription after successful completion 
of phase II trials with the stipulation that firms are mandated to continue with phase III trials.  
In such a system, patients and physicians would make their own evaluations as to whether 
expected benefits outweigh risks (Madden, 2004).
10 The counterargument is that the limited 
safety and efficacy data available after phase II trials are seriously inadequate for informed 
decision-making, which requires the more comprehensive data collected in phase III trials that 
are powered to provide statistically meaningful results. Moreover, the FDA has specialized 
expertise and provides a public good in evaluating the evidence on safety and efficacy, 
including imposing minimum standards with respect to each of these factors, before launch. 
Such information would be underprovided in a free market regime and costly to assimilate for 
individual physicians and patients. Although health plans can -- and do -- serve as 
intermediaries who assess the relative merits of individual drugs, consumers may view health   27
plans as imperfect agents, given their financial stake in controlling drug spending. Independent 
reviewers such as Consumers Reports lack access to the full clinical information which is 
essential to identify drug effects, controlling for patient condition and other treatments. 
Moreover, the social benefit of a regulatory review process that establishes minimum 
standards for marketed drugs has plausibly increased with the growth in number of drugs and 
with insurance coverage. At the time of the 1962 Amendments, there were far fewer drugs on 
the market and virtually all consumers paid out of pocket. Hence the main potential benefit 
from a regulatory requirement for efficacy was to protect consumers from wasteful spending on 
useless drugs, including delayed recovery and other medical costs. At that time, the drugs 
available were few and mostly well known, hence the information burden on physicians or 
consumers was relatively modest. Since then, there has been a vast expansion in number, 
complexity and potency of drugs available, and with many consumers, especially seniors, take 
multiple prescriptions. Consequently, the potential frequency and severity of adverse drug 
reactions and interactions has increased, as has the information burden of staying informed and 
the potential cost from being misinformed. Moreover, the growth of insurance coverage has 
undermined individual consumer’s financial incentives to avoid ineffective drugs which could 
exacerbate wasteful spending on drugs that are of low or only minor benefit. Thus in our view, 
the case remains strong for a regulatory agency such as the FDA to establish minimum 
standards of safety, efficacy and quality as a condition of market access. However, the optimal 
integration of post-launch data with the pre-launch RCT data remains an important issue to be 
resolved. 
A second critical regulatory issue is the optimal mix and coordination of agency 
regulation and tort liability. The theory of optimal policy to control safety when markets suffer   28
from imperfect information generally views regulation and tort liability as alternatives. In 
theory, since the FDA is an expert agency that employs specialists in the design and evaluation 
of clinical trials and is guided by advisory panels comprised of external medical and statistical 
experts that review and evaluate comprehensive data on risks and benefits, their decisions 
should be better informed and more consistent across drugs than decisions of lay juries, made in 
the context of an adverse outcome to an individual patient who may have had many competing 
medical and life-style risk factors in addition to taking the drug at issue. The FDA approves 
drugs on the basis of population risks and benefits, which by definition are average effects, but 
it is intrinsically difficult to apply such trade-offs to individual patients in tort cases. For 
example, if the FDA decided that a 1 percent risk of an adverse outcome from a drug was 
acceptable in view of its benefits, how does a jury decide whether an individual patient’s 
adverse event is within this 1 percent, in which case the producer should not be found liable, or 
lies outside the 1 percent, in which case the drug may be less safe than expected and the firm 
should be liable? More generally, the concept of a “defective product”, which is the basis of 
product liability, is problematic when applied to drugs that necessarily entail risks and/or are 
ineffective for some patients. Unclear standards lead to erratic and unpredictable liability 
rulings, in which case incentives for safety are likely to be excessive (Craswell and Calfee, 
1986). Moreover, tort decisions made ex post, after a drug has been on the market, are at risk of 
applying current information retroactively, that is, holding a firm liable for rare or cumulative 
adverse events that only emerge after widespread or long-term use, which the firm could not 
reasonably have foreseen and for which the FDA did not require testing. Given the extensive 
pre-market regulation of drugs, one proposal is that if a drug is in full compliance with FDA 
requirements, including full information disclosure by the company to the FDA, then FDA   29
compliance should be a bar to tort claims except on grounds of gross negligence, or at least a 
bar to punitive damages.  
A more extreme proposal would replace tort liability for negligence or product defect 
with a no-fault compensation fund, to provide compensation to patients injured by drugs 
without regard to producer negligence or product defect, funded by a tax on drugs. The model 
for this proposal is the workers’ compensation system or the Vaccine Compensation Fund 
(VCF), which was established in 1984 to provide compensation on a no-fault basis for injuries 
caused by vaccines, replacing tort liability on manufacturers, and funded by a tax on vaccines. 
However, the VCF model is relatively simple to administer because vaccine injuries are rare, 
they occur in otherwise healthy individuals and causation is usually clear. By contrast, patients 
take therapeutic drugs because they are sick; these drugs claim to increase the probability of 
cure but with no guarantees and with some risk of side effects. In these circumstances, if an 
individual patient is not cured by the drug or suffers an adverse effect, determining whether 
their condition is inappropriately caused by the drug or is simply the inevitable progression of 
their disease is problematic,  both conceptually and empirically. Thus implementing a no-fault 
compensation system that accurately assigns liability if and only if an adverse outcome is 
caused by a drug, which is a necessary condition for appropriate deterrence signals to 
producers, is far more problematic for therapeutic drugs than for vaccines or workplace injuries.  
 
IV. Patents 
Given the high cost of pharmaceutical R&D, patents are essential to induce sustained 
investment and few, if any, industries rely on patents to the extent that the pharmaceutical 
industry does. The pharmaceutical industry benefits from the same patent provisions (20 years   30
from filing) available to firms in any industry, except for the special patent term restoration 
granted for pharmaceuticals under the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, to restore time lost in clinical 
trials (see section II). However, pharmaceutical product patents are more readily enforceable 
and harder to circumvent than patents in many other industries, including medical devices. 
Consequently, many originator pharmaceuticals enjoy an economic life until the patent expires 
and generic entry occurs. By contrast, the economic life of a medical device is at most a few 
years, because imitative entry occurs long before patent expiry, leading to continual incremental 
product improvement. Because of the necessity and value of pharmaceutical patents, the 
pharmaceutical industry has been at the forefront of international negotiations over WTO patent 
provisions.  
There is an extensive general economics literature examining the tradeoff between the 
duration/scope of patents and optimal incentives for innovation (Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; 
Klemperer, 1990; Lerner, 1994; Levy, 1999).  Early research attempted to quantify the impact 
of patents by surveying pharmaceutical managers.  Based on a survey of 100 R&D managers, 
Mansfield (1986) reported that between 1981-1983 60% of pharmaceutical products would not 
have been developed and 65% would not have entered competitive markets without the benefit 
of patent protection.  Similar research among R&D directors in the UK reported that 
pharmaceutical investment in R&D would be 65% lower without patents (Taylor C.T., 1973; 
Silberson,Z. 1987).  While these survey estimates may be useful benchmarks, they do not 
necessarily provide an accurate estimate of the counter-factual level of R&D effort in a world 
without patents. Although a full review of pharmaceutical patents is beyond the scope of this 
paper, issues that intersect with regulation are briefly reviewed here.  
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1. Patent Length and Conditions for Generic Entry  
The effective patent life of pharmaceuticals is less than the statutory 20 years because 
patents are usually filed early in the discovery process but drug development and approval takes 
many years.  Analysis of 126 products introduced in the 1990-1995 period shows average 
patent life of 11.7 years, with a right skewed tail (Grabowski and Vernon, 2000; Grabowski, 
2002; Kuhlik, 2004).  The Hatch-Waxman Act provides for patent term restoration on a 1:1 
basis for NDA review time and 0.5:1 basis for clinical testing time, up to a maximum of 5 years 
restored and total effective patent length of 14 years.   
The Hatch-Waxman compromise counterbalanced these patent extensions with an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) process for generics, which requires that generics 
show chemical and bio-equivalence to the originator drug, but permits them to reference the 
safety and efficacy data of the originator product. Moreover, the Bolar Amendment permitted 
companies to start work on generics before the originator patent has expired, thereby enabling 
prompt generic entry as soon as patents expire. By reducing the cost of regulatory approval, 
these measures increased the number of generic entrants, which in turn increases competitive 
pressure on prices.  
In addition, during the 1970s-1980s, all states repealed anti-substitution dispensing laws 
and established default rules which allow pharmacists to substitute an AB-rated (FDA-approved 
bioequivalent) generic for a brand drug unless the physician specifies that the brand is required. 
By 1984, generic substitution had already expanded from 7.3 percent of eligible prescriptions in 
1980 to 16 percent in 1984 (Levy, 1999). In the 1980s and 1990s the reimbursement strategies 
used by pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), HMOs and Medicaid established strong financial 
incentives for pharmacists to substitute generics, where available. These third party payers treat   32
generics and brands as fully substitutable. They use a form of generic reference pricing (see 
below) in reimbursing pharmacies for multisource drugs. Specifically, they typically pay 
pharmacies a Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC), which is based on the acquisition price of a 
low-cost generic, regardless of which generically equivalent product is dispensed. Since 
pharmacies capture the margin between the MAC and their acquisition cost, they have strong 
incentives to substitute the cheapest generics, and this in turn creates incentives for generic 
suppliers to compete on price. If patients want the brand, they must pay the difference between 
the MAC and the cost of the brand (plus any other co-payment). Thus the main customers of 
generic firms are the large pharmacy chains, including mass merchandisers such as Walmart, 
and the wholesalers that supply the independent pharmacies; these customers are highly 
concentrated and highly price sensitive, and generics compete on price, not brand image. In 
contrast to this pharmacy-driven generics market model in the US, generics markets in many 
other countries, including the EU and Latin America, have been physician-driven, with higher-
priced, branded generics. For example, until recently countries such as France, Spain and Italy 
paid pharmacists a percentage of the price of the drug and/or did not permit generic substitution 
by pharmacies unless the physician prescribes by generic name. In this environment, generic 
producers market to physicians, competing on brand rather than price, and generic market 
shares are smaller and generic prices are higher than in the US (Danzon and Furukawa, 2003). 
Several EU countries have recently changed their regulation of generics, to encourage lower 
prices and larger generic shares. In the US, the generic share of total prescriptions dispensed 
grew from 38.3% in 1999 to 50.1% in 2005, while the generic share of sales grew from 7.4% to 
8.9%.
11 The higher generic share of prescription than sales reflects the low generic prices, 
relative to brands. This generic share of total scripts understates the share of eligible, off-patent   33
scripts that are filled generically, which can exceed 80% within 3 months of patent expiry in the 
US. The growth of generic share of scripts reflects not only increased generic penetration of 
compounds that are off-patent but also the growing number of major drugs that are off-patent.  
Several research-based pharmaceutical firms attempted to enter the generics market in 
the 1990s, but most have divested their generic activities. Since generic firms compete for the 
business of large pharmacy chains and wholesalers by their breadth of product line, prompt 
availability of new generics inventory management and low prices, it is hardly surprising that 
originator firms were unable to compete simply by offering generic versions of their own drugs 
and most now focus on other post-patent strategies, except that some originator firms do 
produce “authorized generic” versions of their own drugs (see below). One major exception is 
Novartis, whose Sandoz generic division is a broad scale and global generic producer, 
particularly after the purchase in 2005 of Eon and Hexal. The Israel-based generics company 
Teva produces the largest volume of US prescriptions, with 364m. retail prescriptions filled in 
2005, compared to 324m. for Pfizer (IMS data, from unpublished presentation).  
Originator brands respond to the rapid generic erosion of brand share after patent expiry 
by a range of strategies, including: raising price to maximize profit from the shrinking, 
relatively price-inelastic brand-loyal segment (Frank and Salkever, 1992); shifting patients to a 
follow-on product, such as a delayed release version of the original drug (Procardia XL vs. 
Procardia) or a single isomer version (Nexium vs. Prilosec), which requires heavy marketing, 
sampling and discounting before the patent expires on the original drug; switching the drug to 
over-the-counter status, which may require clinical trials to show that it is safe and effective 
under patient self-medication; or filing additional patents, challenging generic entrants and/or 
producing an “authorized generic.”     34
  The growth in litigation around patent expiry was fueled by several provisions of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act that have been partly amended in the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act 
(MMA). Specifically, Hatch-Waxman provided that if a generic challenged an originator patent, 
the originator could file for a 30 month stay that blocked generic entry for 30 months or until 
the case was resolved, whichever came first. Originator firms could thus delay generic entry 
indefinitely by filing for additional patents on ancilliary features of the drug, and then file 
successive 30 month stays when generics challenged these patents. The MMA limited the 
number of 30 month stays to one per ANDA. FTC and class action suits against firms that have 
allegedly filed frivolous patents have also reduced incentives for such behavior.  
In addition, Hatch-Waxman provided for a 180-days of market exclusivity for the first 
generic firm to successfully challenge a patent and show that it invalid (a Paragraph IV ANDA 
filing). Whether the increase in Paragraph IV filings  -- from just 2% of expirations in the 1980s 
to 20% between 1998-2000, and higher for high-revenue products (Kuhlik, 2004) – reflects 
increased aggressiveness by generic companies seeking payoffs in settlement or increased filing 
of frivolous patents by originators, is debatable. While the intent of the 180 day exclusivity was 
to reward and therefore encourage costly challenges to dubious patents, the competitive effects 
are unclear.  In some cases, originator firms colluded with the generic manufacturers that 
received the 180 day generic exclusivity period, paying them to delay launch of the generic, 
which effectively stayed entry by other potential generic producers of the compound (FTC 
2002). The incentive for such collusion has been greatly reduced both by FTC challenges and 
by the MMA reforms, which provide that the 180 exclusivity period is forfeited if not used in a 
timely manner. However, the circumstances in which originators can legally settle with generic 
challengers remains unresolved and there are valid arguments on both sides: some originator   35
and generic firms argue that settling patent disputes is a legitimate and efficient means to 
resolve uncertainty as to ultimate court decision on patent challenges, and that settlement 
reduces litigation expenditures and enables both sides to pursue long term investment strategies; 
on the other hand, the FTC tends to view such settlements as anti-competitive, which would be 
correct if the challenged patents are clearly invalid and settlement were solely a means to delay 
competitive entry.  
A final area of litigation is over the originator strategy of marketing an authorized (i.e. 
licensed) generic version of the brand product during the Paragraph IV180-day exclusivity 
period.  Absent an authorized generic, the sole generic during a 180-day exclusivity period 
generally captures significant market share at a price only slightly below the brand price. 
Competition from an “authorized generic” generally reduces the price, quantity and profit 
earned by the generic owner of the 180-day exclusivity, and hence may reduce incentives of 
generic firms to challenge patents. Clearly, if the US Patent Office could rule instantly and 
accurately on all patent filings, originator firms would have no incentive to file dubious patents 
and there would be no social value in patent challenges by generics. But since patent filings are 
reviewed only with delay, and higher courts may overturn decisions by lower courts, incentives 
for frivolous filings remain and hence there may be some social value in encouraging generic 
patent challenges. Whether generic incentives to challenge patents are closer to optimal with or 
without authorized generics is an unresolved empirical question. 
  As costs of generic entry and hence the number of generic entrants depend, in part, on 
the ability to reference data and results from studies conducted by originator firms, data 
exclusivity policies are an important determinant of effective patent protection.  Hatch-Waxman 
granted data exclusivity for five years from the NDA approval (and three years for data not used   36
in clinical trial), and these exclusivity provisions have been relaxed by subsequent rulings 
(Kuhlik, 2004). Differences across countries in effective patent life in part reflect differences in 
these data exclusivity provisions, as well as differences in regulatory requirements for generic 
approval and substitution by pharmacies, and reimbursement incentives for pharmacists and 
patients to prefer generics.  
Empirical studies of generic entry have shown, not surprisingly, that generic prices are 
inversely related to number of generic competitors (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992); generic 
entry is more likely for compounds with large markets (measured by pre-expiry brand revenue), 
chronic disease markets and oral-solid (pill) form (Scott Morton, 1999; Scott Morton, 2000). 
Caves and Whinston (1991) find that total volume does not increase after patent expiration, 
despite the significant drop in price due to generic entry, indicating that the price effect is offset 
by the negative promotion effect, because incentives for promotion cease at patent expiration. 
Similarly, Scott Morton (2000) finds no significant generic deterrent effect of incumbent 
advertising via detailing or journal advertising from 2-3 years prior to generic entry. This is 
unsurprising, given that the generic switching decision is made mainly by pharmacists and 
patients, in response to their financial incentives, not by physicians who are the target of 
detailing and journal advertising.  
Originator firms can seek FDA regulatory permission to switch a prescription (Rx) 
branded product to over-the-counter (OTC) status (which makes it available to patients without 
prescription) at any time, but this is usually done around patent expiry, to avoid cannibalization 
of the Rx version and possibly to pre-empt generic erosion. If the OTC switch involves a 
change of formulation, strength or indication, the FDA requires additional clinical trials to show 
safety and efficacy under patient self-medication. To encourage these costly investments, the   37
FDA grants three years of market exclusivity to a successful OTC switch, which delays entry of 
generic (private label) versions of the OTC formulation, but not of the Rx version. OTC 
approval is more likely for drugs to treat conditions that are easily self-diagnosed, the potential 
for abuse or misuse is low, labeling can reasonably communicate any risks and medical 
oversight is not required for effective and safe use of the product.  Prices of OTC products are 
lower than Rx medicines, possibly reflecting lack of insurance coverage for OTC products. 
Social welfare is likely to increase, unless the OTC entails significant patient risk or preempts a 
potentially cheaper generic Rx version (Temin 1983). Keeler et al. (2002) estimate a demand 
function for nicotine replacement drugs and combine this with epidemiological evidence of 
medical and quality of life benefits to determine a net social benefit of approximately $2 billion 
per year for OTC conversion of these drugs.  
 
2. Patents, “Access”, and Static Efficiency: Industrialized vs. Developing Countries 
Pharmaceutical patents raise the standard issue of static efficiency loss, if prices to 
consumers exceed marginal cost and result in suboptimal consumption. However, for most 
industrialized countries that have comprehensive health insurance coverage for drugs with at 
most modest patient co-payments, this patent-induced tendency for underconsumption is 
mitigated by an insurance-induced tendency for overconsumption. Probably a greater concern in 
these contexts is that health insurance reduces the demand elasticity facing the firm and hence 
creates incentives to charge prices that are significantly higher than would occur due solely to 
patents. Public insurers’ response to this by price regulation is discussed below.  
However, the potential for significant static inefficiency and welfare loss due to patent-
induced underconsumption remains a serious concern for developing countries, where insurance   38
is limited and most consumers pay out of pocket for drugs. Under the WTO TRIPS 
requirements, all WTO members must adopt a patent regime with 20 year product patents (from 
date of filing) by 2015, with the proviso that governments may grant a compulsory license to 
generic producers in the event of a “national emergency”.
12 The scope of this compulsory 
licensing provision remains disputed, both with respect to the health conditions and the 
countries to which it applies, and whether it is de facto being undermined by bilateral trade 
agreements initiated particularly by the US, that stipulate stricter patent provisions.  
In practice, it is an empirical question whether product patents in developing countries 
would result in a significant welfare loss due to high prices and underconsumption (see for 
example, Fink, 2001; Watal 2000; Chaudhuri et al. 2006). If demand facing a patent holder is 
highly price-elastic due to low willingness or ability to pay, then a firm’s profit-maximizing 
strategy may be to charge prices close to marginal cost, despite the patent. In fact, some 
companies have not bothered to file patents in several African countries that (in theory at least) 
would enforce them (Attaran, 2004), suggesting that they perceived little value in patents due to 
some mix of highly elastic demand, costs of filing and weak enforcement. If demand is highly 
elastic such that, even with enforceable patents, profit-maximizing prices in low income 
countries would be close to marginal cost, then the welfare loss due to patents is small but so is 
the incentive to invest in R&D to treat diseases endemic to these countries. Chaudhuri et al. 
(2006 forthcoming) estimate demand elasticities and supply parameters in the anti-infective 
market for quinolones and conclude that patents would result in a welfare loss to consumers of 
$305m. per year, compared to a gain to patent holders of only $20m., and a reduction of 
“generic” firm profits of $35m. However, the welfare loss estimates are obviously sensitive to 
demand elasticities and might be reduced by price discrimination.     39
In designing an optimal regulatory framework for pharmaceuticals for developing 
countries, it is important to distinguish between two classes of drugs, global vs. LDC-only drug. 
For global drugs that treat diseases such as diabetes, cardiovascular conditions or ulcers, that are 
common in both developed and developing countries, market segmentation and differential 
pricing can in principle reconcile affordability in LDCs with incentives for R&D: firms can 
recoup their R&D investments by pricing above marginal cost in high income countries while 
pricing close to marginal cost in LDCs. In this context, price discrimination across countries is 
likely to increase output and static efficiency, while also enhancing dynamic efficiency, through 
quasi-Ramsey pricing of the R&D joint assets.
13 In practice, actual cross national price 
differences diverge from ideal Ramsey differentials, for many reasons including the risks of 
external referencing and parallel trade (Danzon and Towse, 2003, 2005), and possibly 
incentives for regulatory free riding by large purchasers in regulated markets (see below).  
Although actual price differentials are not ideal, the theoretical case is strong for 
establishing regulatory frameworks that support price discrimination and limit cross-national 
price spillovers through external referencing and parallel trade. Under these conditions, patent 
regimes could function to stimulate R&D for drugs with a significant industrialized market 
potential, without significant welfare loss in developing countries if firms choose to set low 
prices due to elastic demand.
14 As a modification, Lanjouw (2002) proposes a regime in which 
firms could opt for patents in either developed or developing countries. Assuming that most 
firms would opt for developing country patents, the main benefit of such a system would be to 
reduce uncertainty with respect to patent enforcement and prices in developing countries.  
  However, for drugs to treat diseases that are endemic only in developing countries, 
patents are likely to be an ineffective mechanism to achieve the dynamic efficiency goal of   40
stimulating investment in R&D, because consumers cannot pay prices sufficient to recoup R&D 
investments. In that case the question of static efficiency loss is moot. The very low level of 
private sector R&D for LDC-only diseases, despite patent regimes in most low income 
countries, tends to confirm that patents are ineffective in inducing R&D for LDC-only drugs.  
In response to the great need but low levels of private sector investments in drugs to 
treat LDC-only diseases, there has been a recent spate of “push” and “pull” subsidy proposals 
and some initiatives to find new institutional solutions. In particular, a highly diverse set of 
public private partnerships (PPPs) has developed that combine government and philanthropic 
funds with private industry expertise and resources, to address diseases such as malaria 
(Medicines for Malaria Venture), tuberculosis (the Global Alliance for TB) , an AIDs vaccine 
(the International AIDs Vaccine Initiative, IAVI), and many others. The basic issues are 
outlined in Kremer (2002); for a review of PPP initiatives see the Health Partnership Database 
(Research 2006). The G8 countries have recently committed to fund an Advance Market 
Commitment (AMC) that commits to paying a pre-specified price to purchasing vaccines that 
meet specified conditions, with details still to be determined. While the optimal mix of push and 
pull mechanisms remains to be determined, the extent of donor funding and range of current 
initiatives is very encouraging, with several promising candidates in late stage development. 
LDC governments and international agencies such as the Global Fund are appropriately 
reluctant to pay for drugs that have not passed regulatory review of safety and efficacy. Thus as 
more of these drugs reach clinical trials, the case for developing an regulatory review agency or 
pathway that is appropriate for LDC drugs (see section II) will become more pressing.  
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V. Regulation of Prices, Insurance Reimbursement, Profits etc.  
1. The Rationale for Price and Profit Regulation  
Regulation of pharmaceutical prices is a priori anomalous because the pharmaceutical 
industry is structurally competitive, with relatively low concentration overall. Although 
concentration within specific therapeutic categories is greater, the market is contestable, as 
evidenced by the growing share of new products discovered by relatively new biotechnology 
firms. Patents grant exclusivity on a specific compound for the term of the patent. But a patent 
on one compound does not prevent competition from other compounds to treat the same 
condition. Competitive entry is initiated long before the first compound in a new class reaches 
the market. Competitor firms can obtain information on each others’ drugs in development from 
patent filings, scientific conferences and other sources that are collated in publicly available 
databases, while techniques of rational drug design facilitate the development of close substitute 
compounds in new therapeutic classes.  
Acemoglu and Linn (2004) show that entry of new drugs responds to expected 
demographic market size. Specifically, they find that a one percent increase in expected 
demographic demand results in a four percent increase in entry of NMEs / non-generic drugs 
and a six percent increase in total number of drugs, including generics.  DiMasi and Paquette 
(2004) find that entry of follow-on compounds has reduced the period of market exclusivity of 
first entrants to a new therapeutic class from 10.2 years in the 1970s to 1.2 years in the late 
1990s. Lichtenberg and Philipson (2002) compare the effect on a drug’s net present value at 
launch of within molecule (generic) competition vs. between molecule (therapeutic) 
competition. They conclude that the reduction in discounted drug lifetime value from 
therapeutic competition (most of which occurs while the drug is on-patent) is at least as large as   42
the effect due to post-patent generic entry. Of course, a much higher discount factor is applied 
to generic erosion because the NPV is measured at launch; still, this study provides an 
interesting measure of therapeutic competition.  
The limited market power that results from patents is reinforced by two other 
institutional characteristics of pharmaceuticals. First, in industrialized countries patients must 
obtain a physician’s prescription in order to get most drugs. If physicians are uninformed about 
drug prices and/or are imperfect agents for patients and are not themselves at risk for drug 
spending, the separation of prescribing from consumption reduces demand elasticity.  
Second, insurance coverage for pharmaceuticals makes patients less price-sensitive, 
hence makes the demand facing manufacturers less elastic which would lead them to charge 
higher prices, in the absence of controls. Co-payments can mitigate the insurance effect, but 
because co-payments also reduce financial protection, in practice most public insurance plans 
include only very modest co-payments. To counteract this price-increasing tendency of 
insurance, both private and public insurers set limits on the prices that they pay for all insured 
services including drugs, physician and hospital visits. In the US, private insurers negotiate drug 
prices with manufacturers as a condition of formulary placement and insurance coverage; 
although large private payers such as Kaiser have significant bargaining power, none have 
monopsony power and suppliers can and do choose not to supply a particular plan if its offered 
prices are unacceptably low.  
Most industrialized countries other than the US have either a universal national 
insurance scheme, with the government as sole insurer, or a system of mandatory quasi-private 
social insurance funds that are regulated by the government. Controlling prices as a way to 
control supplier moral hazard applies to all services, including pharmaceuticals. For example,   43
Japan has a single fee schedule that sets fees for all medical services, including drugs. 
Consistent with this view of pharmaceutical price regulation as fundamentally an insurance 
strategy to control supplier moral hazard, price controls in most countries apply only if drugs 
are reimbursed by the public health plan. A firm is free to market a drug at unregulated prices 
once registration requirements are met. It is only if the firm seeks to have its product 
reimbursed by the public insurance that the price must be approved by the price regulatory 
body.  
In the US, the Medicare program for seniors and the disabled did not cover outpatient 
prescription drugs until the new Medicare Part D drug benefit, authorized in the 2003 Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act (MMA) was implemented in January 
2006. Following intense debate over the design of the program, the 2003 MMA stipulates that 
the Medicare drug benefit is to be delivered through private prescription drug plans (PDPs) 
using negotiated formularies similar to those negotiated by private sector pharmacy benefit 
managers (PBMs). The federal government is specifically barred from negotiating drug prices.  
However, if expenditures under this program exceed original projections, future legislation 
could renounce this non-interference clause and establish a government run plan, making the 
US government the purchaser for roughly 50 percent of US drug spending. Estimates for the 
Medicare drug benefit have already increased from $404B for 2004-2013 (CBO 2004(a)) to 
$724B for 2006-2015 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2005(b)). 
Other government drug purchasing programs in the US include the federal-state 
Medicaid program and several smaller federal programs. The 1990 Omnibus and Reconciliation 
Act requires originator drugs to give Medicaid the lower of (a) the “best price” offered to any 
non-federal purchaser or (b) a 15.1% discount off AMP (average manufacturer price). To deter   44
the incentive to increase private price in response to the best price provision, an “excess-
inflation” rebate is also required for price increases that exceed the CPI. For 2003, the 
combined effect of these mandatory discounts resulted in a 31.4% discount for Medicaid, 
relative to AMP (CBO June 2005b). Similarly, for the Big Four Federal programs (the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Public Health Service and the 
Coast Guard) the Federal Ceiling Price mandates a discount of 24 percent off non-federal 
average manufacturing price, plus an excess inflation rebate. In 2003, the average Big Four 
price was roughly 38 percent below the AMP (CBO 2003a). Thus public purchasers in the US 
have regulated prices by mandatory discounts off private sector prices. This has resulted in 
relatively low prices for public programs, but has also reduced the discounts firms grant to 
private plans and possibly increased list prices. This inflationary effect on private prices of best 
price requirements by public payers is expected to be significantly reduced after 2006, because 
the MMA transferred seniors who are eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare (“dual 
eligibles”) from the Medicaid program to the privately administered Medicare Part D program. 
This reduced the effective Medicaid best price “tax” on discounts granted to private purchasers.  
Empirical evidence confirms that these rules tying Medicaid rebates to “best” private 
sector prices lead to a decline in discounts to private payers.  GAO (1993) found that median 
best price discounts to HMOs declined from 24.4 percent before the law went into effect in 
1991, to 14.2 percent in 1993 (GAO 1993); CBO (1996) found similar evidence. Because 
discounts are confidential, academic studies have focused on the effects of the Medicaid best 
price provision on available measures of prices, which are gross of buyer-specific discounts. 
Using transactions prices from IMS, Scott-Morton (1997) found no effect for drugs which did 
not have generic competition, but modest price increases in product categories with generic   45
competition after the enactment of the Medicaid best price policy in 1991. In a similar study, 
Duggan and Scott Morton exploit the variation in the Medicaid market share for the top 200 
selling products in the US to estimate the effect of the Medicaid legislation on average prices.  
They conclude that a ten percent increase in Medicaid market share resulted in a 7 to 10 percent 
increase in their measure of average price.
15 Whether the reduction in Medicaid market-share 
following the 2006 transfer of dual eligibles led to a reversal of this effect remains to be tested. 
Widespread awareness that tying public prices to private prices leads to increases in private 
prices is one reason this approach was not adopted for Medicare Part D.  
 
3. Pricing and Competition in Unregulated Markets 
On-Patent Brands   The early literature provides some evidence on competition in 
pharmaceutical markets before the advent of widespread insurance coverage and associated 
price controls. Opinion in the economic and policy literature was divided on extent and welfare 
effects of competition. Some viewed closely substitutable, patented  products as wasteful ‘me-
toos’, arguing that patent protection leads to excessive product differentiation and higher prices 
(for example, Comanor, 1986; Temin, 1979). Under this view, the 1962 Amendments, by 
requiring proof of efficacy and restricting drug advertising, may have restricted “excessive 
differentiation”. The alternative view is that the availability of more substitute products prior to 
1962 increased price competition and benefited consumers. To assess the impact of the 1962 
Amendments on prices, Peltzman (1973) examined average price changes from 1952 to 1962 
and a cross sectional analysis for 1958-1961, prior to the 1962 regulations. He found no 
evidence that the number of NCEs had any net impact on drug price inflation and concluded 
that, if anything, drug price growth increased after the 1962 Amendments, contrary to the   46
“wasteful competition” hypothesis. 
Other studies have examined launch prices and price trends over a drug’s lifecycle. In a 
study of launch prices of drugs introduced between 1958 and 1975, Reekie (1978) found that 
new drugs that offer significant therapeutic advance were priced above existing drugs but 
tended to lower price over time, whereas imitators were priced lower initially but tended to 
increase prices. Similarly, Lu and Comanor (1998) using data for 144 new drugs launched in 
the US between 1978 and 1987 found evidence of a skimming strategy for innovative drugs and 
a penetration strategy by imitators. This evidence is consistent with some degree of competition 
but imperfectly informed buyers, such that sellers offer a low initial price to encourage use and 
build reputation or loyalty, then raise prices over time (Schmalensee, 1982). 
In the US, the nature and extent of competition in pharmaceutical markets has changed 
with the growth of managed drug coverage in the 1980s and 1990s, as practiced by HMOs, 
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and the prescription drug plans (PDPs) that manage the 
Medicare drug benefit.
16 PBMs typically establish formularies of preferred drugs that are 
selected on the basis of price and effectiveness.  Tiered co-payments and other strategies are 
used to encourage patients and their physicians to the use “preferred” drugs in the class. Such 
strategies are designed to increase the cross-price elasticity of demand between therapeutic 
substitutes and between generic equivalents. By using formularies to shift market share between 
therapeutically similar on-patent drugs and hence increase the demand elasticity facing 
manufacturers, PBMs are able to negotiate discounts in return for preferred formulary status. 
These discounts are confidential, hence detailed analysis is not available. However, anecdotal 
evidence confirms the theoretical prediction that discounts are larger to purchasers that have 
tight control over drug use, such as Kaiser, and in classes with several close substitute products.   47
Evidence that new drugs are launched at list prices below the price of established drugs in the 
same product class and that the discount is greater, the greater the number of existing drugs in 
the product class (Boston Consulting Group, 1993) indicates that competition does reduce 
prices even for unmanaged consumers.  
Although discounting through confidential, electronic rebates to PBMs, as agents of 
payers and consumers, has no doubt stimulated price competition, it has been attacked on 
several grounds. First, because it is essentially a system of price discrimination, those who pay 
higher prices feel aggrieved and indeed the results would strike many as inequitable. 
Specifically, the largest discounts go to plans with tightly controlled formularies that tend to 
attract relatively healthy, privately insured non-seniors, whereas uninsured and other cash-
paying customers face the highest prices. This differential in manufacturer prices is amplified 
for retail prices because PBMs also negotiate discounts in pharmacy dispensing margins, 
relative to unmanaged dispensing fees pharmacies charge to cash-paying customers. Combining 
the manufacturer and pharmacy discounts, consumers with managed drug benefits face 
approximately 20% lower drug costs (GAO, 1997; GAO, 2003) compared to uninsured patients, 
including many seniors before the 2006 implementation of Medicare Part D.  
Second, discounting has been challenged by retail pharmacists in antitrust litigation 
alleging collusive pricing and price discrimination by drug manufacturers (Scherer, 1997; 
Danzon, 1997). Dispensing pharmacies do not receive the same discounts given to PBMs 
because pharmacies cannot - and arguably should not – independently influence a 
physician/patient’s choice between therapeutic substitutes. This litigation conspicuously 
excluded off-patent, multisource drugs, because for these drugs the discounts go to the 
pharmacies, because they are the decision-makers in choosing between generically equivalent   48
versions of a prescribed compound. Under the settlement of this litigation, manufacturer 
discounts were to be made available on the same terms to all purchasers; however, because 
PBMs design the formularies that drive therapeutic substitution, they remain the main recipients 
of discounts on on-patent drugs, although wholesalers do receive modest prompt payment and 
volume-related discounts.  
Third, as noted earlier, incentives for discounts to private payers have been reduced by 
the matching requirement, that manufacturers of brand drugs give to Medicaid the “best price” 
given to private payers or a 15.1% discount off Average Manufacturer Price, whichever is 
lower. This best price provision effectively imposes a significant tax on discounts to private 
payers, because Medicaid demand is totally inelastic with respect to this discount. Theory 
suggests that this best price provision would reduce best price discounts to private payers and 
this is confirmed by evidence from several studies (CBO, 1996; GAO, 1994).  
Finally, because the discounts are confidential, payers who contract with PBMs as 
agents accuse the PBMs of pocketing rather than passing on the discounts. Since the Medicare 
drug benefit will be delivered by competing, private “prescription drug plans” similar to PBMs, 
both Medicare (that will heavily subsidize the benefit) and seniors (who contribute to 
premiums, pay significant co-payments and must choose between competing plans) have 
demanded “price transparency”. However, CBO (2004) estimated a significantly higher cost for 
a variant of the Medicare drug benefit that required price transparency, under the assumption 
that transparency would erode drug manufacturers’ competitive incentives to discount and 
hence would lead to higher drug prices. The final MMA legislation requires PDPs to reveal 
discounts in aggregate but not drug-specific prices. 
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Generics  In most US health plans, reimbursement for multisource drugs (off-patent 
drugs with at least one generic, in addition to the originator) is designed to create strong 
incentives for decision-makers to prefer generics over their brand equivalents. These regulatory 
and reimbursement structures in turn generate intense generic price competition and large 
generic market shares. Specifically, most HMOs, PBMs and Medicaid plans cap pharmacy 
reimbursement for multisource drugs at the price of a low priced generic, the MAC or 
maximum allowable charge for that compound. If the patient wants the originator brand, he or 
she must pay the difference between the brand price and the MAC (or a third-tier co-pay, in 
some tiered formularies). Since the 1980s, most states have overturned traditional anti-
substitution laws and now authorize pharmacists to dispense any bioequivalent generic, unless 
the physician explicitly requires the brand.  
Since pharmacists capture any margin between the MAC and their acquisition cost, 
pharmacists have strong incentives to seek out cheap generics. For generic drug manufacturers, 
the primary customers are large pharmacy chains and group purchasers for independent 
pharmacies. This highly concentrated and price-sensitive pharmacy demand creates incentives 
for generics to compete on price. If the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act opened the door to cheap and 
prompt generic entry in the US, generic substitution programs adopted by PBMs, HMOs and 
Medicaid in the late 1980s and 1990s stimulated generic market shares while MAC 
reimbursement drives generic price competition. Masson and Steiner (1985) show that for a 
sample of 37 multisource drugs in 1980, pharmacists obtained the generic at an average price 45 
percent lower than the brand, but the difference at retail was only 24.3 percent, because the 
pharmacist retained a higher average absolute margin on the generics. Similarly, Grabowski and 
Vernon (1996) show that for 15 drugs whose patents expired between 1984 and 1987, the   50
average absolute margin was roughly 40 percent higher on the generic. More recent anecdotal 
reports confirm that pharmacy margins are higher on generics than on on-patent brands.  
Most studies of generic drug markets focus on the effects of the 1984 Hatch-Waxman 
Act on generic entry and on the effect of generics on prices, promotional activity and market 
shares of brand drugs. Since market conditions have evolved in the 1990s with the growth of 
managed drug benefits, the findings of these studies should be viewed as context-dependent. 
Grabowski and Vernon (1992), using data on patent expirations that spanned the 1984 Act, find 
that generic prices were significantly inversely related to number of generic competitors, but 
some brand prices increased after generic entry. Frank and Salkever (1992) show that a brand 
manufacturer may rationally increase the brand price following generic entry, as a response to 
market segmentation in which generics attract the price elastic consumers, leaving the brand 
with the price-inelastic, brand-loyal consumers. Brand advertising may decrease, since much of 
the benefit accrues to generics due to substitution; conversely, generics have no incentive to 
advertise if they are viewed as substitutable.  
  Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) analyze post-patent pricing and promotion for 30 
drugs whose patents expired between 1976 and 1987. They find significant reduction in brand 
promotion even before patent expiration. The net effect of less promotion and lower generic 
prices is that quantity sold does not increase significantly after patent expiration, despite a lower 
weighted average price for the molecule. All of these studies underestimate generic penetration 
since the growth of managed drug benefits in the 1990s. Whereas Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz 
(1991) find that pharmacists were quite conservative in exercising their right to substitute a 
generic, for recent patent expirations the originator may lose over 80 percent of the market 
within several weeks of patent expiry in the US.               51
  Summarizing, conclusions on competition in the brand and generic pharmaceutical 
industries depend on the context, in particular, on the insurance arrangements, reimbursement 
and price regulatory structure and resulting incentives for physicians, pharmacies and patients, 
which interact to determine manufacturer demand elasticities and hence optimal manufacturer 
pricing strategies. Similarly, estimates of demand elasticities depend on the context, including 
such factors as whether the drug is on-patent or generic, whether the measure of price is the co-
payment to the patient, the full transaction price to the payer, or a list price, and on relevant 
pharmacy and physician incentives.  
 
3.  Forms of price and reimbursement regulation 
Design of the optimal structure of price regulation or other controls on pharmaceutical 
spending is a complex problem that has not been adequately addressed in the literature. The one 
clear conclusion is that no country has an ideal solution. As noted earlier, market power of 
pharmaceuticals derives from patents and from comprehensive insurance coverage, hence 
standard regulatory models of price regulation for natural monopolies are inappropriate. 
Standard models of optimal insurance contracts are also inadequate. These tend to focus on the 
design of consumer co-payments to constrain moral hazard (for example, Pauly, 1968; 
Zeckhauser, 1971; Ma and Riordan, 2002). Since higher co-payments reduce financial 
protection, optimal co-payments for drugs may be too low to provide much constraint on 
pricing, especially for chronic and expensive drugs, given the concentration of spending by 
patients with multiple prescriptions. Optimal provider cost-sharing has been analyzed for 
physician and hospital services (for example, Ellis and McGuire, 1991) but not for 
pharmaceuticals. Moreover, the optimal insurance/reimbursement contract for drugs must deter   52
not only insurance-induced overuse by patients/physicians but also excessive prices by 
manufacturers, while paying prices sufficient to reward appropriate R&D, taking into account 
the global scope of pharmaceutical sales.  
  In practice, the structure of pharmaceutical price and reimbursement regulation differs 
across countries and continually evolves. This review focuses on the main prototypes and 
evidence of their effects.  As noted earlier, regulation applies only if the drug is reimbursed. 
Effectively, the regulated price is the maximum reimbursement; it may also (but need not) be 
the maximum price that the firm may charge to insured patients.  
Direct Price Limits     
Under direct price regulation, as used in France, Italy, Spain, Japan etc. the initial launch 
price and any price increases must be approved as a condition of reimbursement, and price 
decreases may be mandated. Most countries use one or both of two criteria in setting prices: (1) 
comparison with other, established drugs in the same class, with potential mark-ups for 
improved efficacy, better side effect profile or convenience, and sometimes for local production 
(hereafter “internal benchmarking”); and (2) comparison with the price of the identical product 
in other countries (hereafter “external benchmarking”).
17  
Internal benchmarking. Effects of regulation through internal benchmarking differ 
depending on the details of each country’s system, including mark-ups for innovation and other 
factors. Hypothesized effects of price regulation on supply decisions include: adjustments to the 
price profile (Anis and Wen, 1998); distortions of R&D level and focus; and distortions of 
location of R&D and/or manufacturing plants, if prices are related to investment in the local 
economy.  
If post-launch price increases are not permitted, a drug’s real price declines over its life-  53
cycle. Consequently, if follow-on products are benchmarked to an old drug, the real launch 
price declines for successive entrants in a class. This downward trend of prices over the life-
cycle is most extreme in Japan, where physicians traditionally dispense drugs and capture any 
margin between a drug’s reimbursement and its acquisition cost. In such contexts, 
manufacturers have an incentive to discount the acquisition price in order to increase the 
physician’s margin and hence gain market share.
18 The Japanese government audits acquisition 
prices bi-annually and reduces the reimbursement price to leave only a 1-2% margin, until the 
next rounds of competitive price cuts. This system of declining post-launch prices allegedly 
traditionally created incentives for Japanese pharmaceutical firms to focus their R&D on 
frequent, minor improvements of existing products in order to obtain higher prices, rather than 
invest in the major innovations necessary to achieve global competitiveness.
19  
Such price regulatory systems are also widely alleged to be used to promote industrial 
policy, by rewarding locally produced products with higher prices, despite the 1989 EU 
Transparency Directive which requires that regulations be ‘transparent’ and neutral with respect 
to country of origin. Such biased regulation creates incentives for nonoptimal location and/or an 
excessive number of manufacturing plants, if these excessive production costs are “offset” by 
higher prices (Danzon and Percy, 1996).  
Although secondary (processing and packaging) manufacturing facilities may plausibly 
be located disproportionately in countries that reward domestic manufacturing through their 
regulated prices, the opposite charge is made with respect to R&D. Specifically, the 
pharmaceutical industry sometimes argues that price regulation discourages investment in 
R&D, due to low and uncertain prices countries that regulate prices. In theory, price regulation 
could reduce R&D due to both the incentive effect of lower expected profits and the financing   54
effect of lower retained earnings. It is empirically true that most R&D is located in countries 
with relatively free pricing, mainly the US and the UK. However, the causal relationship is 
unclear. In theory, given the potentially global market for innovative drugs, and extensive in- 
and out-licensing networks that enable small firms to reach global markets regardless of their 
location, there is no necessary connection between domestic price regulation and firms’ location 
of R&D. Access to world class scientific research and a large pool of human capital may be 
more critical. As governments in many countries are establishing tax-subsidies to try to attract 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology R&D, more may be learned about the relative importance of 
financial vs. other factors in R&D location.  
  External benchmarking   Whereas internal benchmarking compares the price of the new 
drug to the prices of competitor products in the domestics, external benchmarking uses as the 
comparator the mean, median or minimum price of the same drug in a designated set of 
countries. For example, Italy uses an average European price, Canada uses the median of seven 
countries (five European countries plus the US and Japan), etc.  
External benchmarking limits the manufacturer’s ability to price discriminate across 
countries. Predicted effects include convergence in the manufacturer’s target launch prices 
across linked markets, with launch delays and non-launch becoming an optimal strategy in low-
price countries, particularly those with small markets. Parallel trade, which is legal in the EU, 
has similar effects to external referencing, except that it generally only affects a fraction of a 
product’s sales. Several studies provide evidence consistent with these predictions (Danzon, 
Wang and Wang, 2004; Kyle, 2005; Lanjouw, 2005; Danzon and Epstein, 2006 forthcoming).  
Welfare effects of regulatory pressures for price convergence across countries are 
theoretically ambiguous but likely to be negative. Analyses of price discrimination vs. uniform   55
pricing show that price discrimination increases static efficiency if output increases. That 
differential pricing increases drug use seems plausible, given the evidence of delays and non-
launch of new drugs in low price countries. Moreover, Ramsey pricing principles suggest that 
differential pricing also contributes to dynamic efficiency (Ramsey, 1927; Baumol and 
Bradford, 1970).
20 So far, external referencing and parallel trade apply mostly between 
countries at fairly similar levels of income, notably within Europe. Welfare losses would likely 
be much larger if referencing or importation were authorized directly between high and low 
income countries, or indirectly via middle income countries. The proposed US Health Security 
Act of 1994 would have limited drug prices in the US to the lowest prices in a group of 22 other 
countries, including several with much lower incomes than the US. More recently, the US has 
enacted a proposal to legalize drug importation from a broad group of countries, but 
implementation is stalled because required safety and savings conditions have not been met. 
Aside from the safety issues raised by drug importation, linking the dominant US market to 
other smaller, lower income markets could have serious negative effects on price and 
availability of drugs in those countries. From a global welfare perspective, forms of price 
regulation that are country specific are likely to yield lower welfare loss than regulatory systems 
that attempt to control one country’s prices by referencing prices or importing drugs from other 
countries.  
 
Reference Price Reimbursement Limits 
Some countries, including Germany, the Netherlands and New Zealand, have 
established reference price (RP) reimbursement systems that limit the reimbursement for drugs 
in designated groups but leave prices uncontrolled. Under RP, products are clustered for   56
reimbursement based on either the same compound (generic referencing) or different 
compounds with similar mode of action and/or same indication (therapeutic referencing). All 
products in a group are reimbursed the same price per daily dose – the reference price (RP). The 
RP is usually set at the price of say the cheapest (or the median, the thirtieth percentile etc.) of 
drugs in the group. Manufacturers may charge prices above the RP, but patients must pay any 
excess. In practice, manufacturers typically drop their prices to the reference price, suggesting 
that demand is highly elastic when patients must pay. 
Reference price reimbursement resembles price regulation with internal benchmarking 
to similar products, but with critical differences that make RP potentially more constraining. 
First, whereas informal benchmarking may permit higher reimbursement for drugs with 
superior efficacy or fewer side-effects, under RP the reimbursement is the same per daily dose, 
for all products in a group, and obtaining higher reimbursement for a more effective drug 
requires establishing a separate class within the same therapeutic category. The RP 
classification system is therefore critical, and assignment of individual drugs is often litigated. 
Second, therapeutic RP systems typically cluster compounds without regard to patent status. 
Consequently, if the RP is based on the cheapest product in the cluster, once one patent expires 
and generic entry occurs, reimbursement for all products in the group drops to the generic price, 
thereby effectively truncating patent life for the newer products in the group, unless patients are 
willing to pay surcharges. The magnitude of this patent-truncating effect is greater, the broader 
the definition of reimbursement clusters and the more price-competitive the generic market. 
Therapeutic RP is predicted to reduce incentives for R&D in general, if the patent-truncating 
effect is large. Negative effects on R&D incentives are likely to be greatest for follow-on 
products or line extensions of existing drugs. Whether any such reduction would be a welfare-  57
enhancing, by eliminating wasteful R&D, or a welfare-reducing, by eliminating potentially 
cost-effective new drugs and reducing competition in a class, is obviously context-specific and 
cannot be predicted a priori. More generally, because incentives for R&D depend on global 
expected revenues, the effects of RP so far are not expected to be large because so far no major 
market has long experience with therapeutic RP. Thus the experience to date is insufficient to 
predict the likely effects on R&D if the US, with its large share of global revenues and highly 
price-competitive generic market, were to adopt therapeutic RP (Danzon and Ketcham, 2004).   
Although Germany adopted RP for some classes starting in 1989, new patented drugs 
were exempt from 1996 to 2004. Moreover, in interpreting the German experience with RP and 
extrapolating to other countries such as the US, it is important to note that generic prices are 
lower, both absolutely and relative to brand prices, in the US than in Germany.
21 Moreover, 
Germany -- like all other countries with RP or price regulation – adopted multiple price and 
spending controls simultaneously. Identifying the separate effects of RP and other constraints is 
therefore problematic.  
The early literature on RP is summarized in Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000).  
Early evidence from Germany confirmed that brand drugs generally dropped their prices when 
RP was introduced, as theory predicts (Maasen, 1995). However, both theory and evidence 
suggest that dynamic price competition over time is weak under RP, because firms have no 
incentive to reduce prices below the RP, unless other provisions make pharmacists price 
sensitive. Zweifel and Crivelli (1996) analyze firms’ response to RP using a duopoly model; 
however, since RP generally applies to classes with multiple products, oligopoly or 
monopolistic competition models may be more relevant. Danzon and Ketcham (2004) provide 
empirical evidence on effects of RP in Germany, the Netherlands and New Zealand, the three   58
most comprehensive RP systems. This evidence suggests that RP had little effect on average 
drug prices or drug availability in Germany or the Netherlands, but that effects on prices and 
availability were significant in New Zealand, which used broader classes and where the 
regulatory agency explicitly required RP-reducing price cuts as a condition of admitting new 
drugs to reimbursement.   
In theory, since RP limits only the insurer’s reimbursement, patients may be willing to 
pay a surcharge if a drug truly offers greater therapeutic benefits. But patients may be 
imperfectly informed about the risks and benefits of individual drugs, and physicians may be 
reluctant to spend the time required to inform patients, since such time is unreimbursed and may 
have a significant opportunity cost. Some manufacturers may choose to charge prices above the 
RP, despite high demand elasticities, to avoid price spillovers to other markets. For example, 
when British Columbia adopted RP, some manufacturers retained prices above the RP, 
plausibly to avoid undermining potentially higher prices in other Canadian provinces. If 
manufacturers do charge surcharges, patients may face significant co-payments, with possible 
effects on drug choice and health outcomes. The evidence on patient health outcomes under RP 
is mixed: some studies find no evidence of adverse effects, while others find an increase in 
adverse outcomes, possibly because patients switched to less appropriate drugs to avoid 
surcharges. The risks of such adverse effects depend on the degree of substitutability between 
drugs, which varies across therapeutic classes. For this reason, Australia and British Columbia 
only apply RP to a select set of therapeutic classes in which drugs are considered highly 
substitutable for most patients. PBMs in the US rarely use therapeutic RP, preferring the more 
flexible tiered formularies. 
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Drug Budgets and Expenditure Controls    
  Price or reimbursement controls alone do not control the growth of drug 
spending, which is also driven by prescription volume and “mix”, that is, switching from older, 
cheaper drugs to newer, higher priced drugs. Most countries that initially controlled only price 
or reimbursement have added other measures to limit total drug spending. Specifically, from 
1993 - 2003, Germany had a drug budget (limit on aggregate spending), with physicians and the 
pharmaceutical industry nominally at risk for successive tiers of any overrun. Physicians 
responded initially by reducing the number of prescriptions and switching to cheaper drugs, 
leading to a 16 percent reduction in drug spending in the first year of the budget (Munnich and 
Sullivan, 1994). Schulenburg et al.(1994) report that referrals to specialists and hospitals 
increased, because the drug budget excluded inpatient drugs. Thus the overall budget saving 
was less than the saving in outpatient drug costs. Germany’s aggregate drug budget was 
abolished in 2003, because enforcing the repayment of overruns was practically and politically 
problematic. Some regions have adopted physician-specific budgets. Whether payers have 
sufficient information to achieve appropriate risk-adjustment of physician-specific budgets 
based on each physician’s patient population remains to be seen – if not, such controls could 
create incentives for physicians to avoid high-risk patients and/or constrain their drug choices. 
France has a limit on total drug spending that is enforced by limits on each company’s 
revenues. Overruns are recouped by price cuts or mandatory rebates on companies and 
therapeutic classes that exceed allowed targets, and on companies that exceed promotion 
guidelines. Similarly, since 2001 Italy limits drug spending to 13 percent of health spending; 
overruns have been recouped by price cuts in major therapeutic classes.  
Since expenditure caps that are enforced by price cuts imply a price-volume trade-off   60
for manufacturers, one potential – and intended – effect is to reduce manufacturers’ incentives 
to expand volume through promotion. However, penalties that apply collectively to all firms 
have only weak effects on firm-specific incentives in the absence of collusion. Company-
specific revenue limits, as in France, create more powerful incentives to constrain promotion 
but also undermine incentives for R&D. As with price and reimbursement controls, these R&D 
incentive effects are negligible as long as controls apply in markets that are a small share of 
global revenue. Such effects would be more significant if drug spending caps enforced by price-
volume offsets were adopted in the US or EU-wide.  
 
Profit or Rate-of-Return Controls     
The UK is unique among industrialized countries in regulating the rate of return on 
capital, leaving manufacturers (relatively) free to set the price of individual drugs. The UK 
Prescription Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) is renegotiated every five years between the 
patented pharmaceutical industry and the government. The PPRS limits each company’s 
revenues from sales to the UK National Health Service as a percent of their capital invested in 
the UK, with specified limits on deductible expenses to pre-empt incentives for expense 
padding. The allowed rate of return is around 17-21 percent; excesses can be repaid directly or 
through lower prices the following year. Companies with minimal capital in the UK can 
substitute a return-on-sales formula.  
One simple theory predicts that pure rate of return regulation induces excessive capital 
investments relative to labor and hence reduces productivity (Averch and Johnson, 1962), 
although these predictions only hold under restrictive assumptions (Joskow 1974). For 
multinational companies, the costs of distortions may be small if capital in manufacturing plants   61
can be allocated across countries at relatively low cost in order to maximize revenues. Such 
flexibility may become more constrained as more regulatory systems link their prices or 
reimbursement to local investment. In a study of the effects of such biased regulatory schemes 
in the UK, France and Italy on labor productivity and total factor productivity, Danzon and 
Percy (1996) found that although the rate of growth of capital and labor in the UK 
pharmaceutical industry has been high, relative to other UK industry and relative to 
pharmaceuticals in other countries, it has not been biased towards capital relative to labor, 
possibly because the permitted company-specific rate of return on capital may partly depend on 
employment levels. Overall, the UK experienced relatively high total factor productivity 
growth, compared to other regulated and unregulated countries.  
With respect to effects on drug prices, the UK is generally considered to have higher 
brand prices than those in the regulated markets of France, Italy and Spain. Consistent with this, 
the UK has a relatively large parallel import share, whereas the price regulated markets of 
France, Italy and Spain are parallel exporters. However, precise price differentials are sensitive 
to the sample of drugs, the time period and the exchange rate (see, for example, Danzon and 
Chao, 2000a; Danzon and Furukawa, 2003; Danzon and Furukawa, 2006 forthcoming). The 
UK’s overall spending on drugs, either as a share of health spending or per capita, is not out of 
line with other EU countries, plausibly reflecting other characteristics of their health care 
system, including strong pharmacy incentives for generic substitution and physician 
reimbursement that creates incentives for cost-conscious prescribing.
 22  The UK 
pharmaceutical industry has also contributed more significantly to the flow of new medicines 
than most other countries of comparable size. Nevertheless, following a recent review of the 
PPRS the UK Office of Fair Trade recommended that the UK move to a system of “value-based   62
pricing” regulation, in place of profit regulation (Office of Fair Trade, 2007; Danzon, 2007). 
Whether such a change will be implemented and its likely effects remain to be determined.  
 
Cost-Effectiveness Requirements 
  Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK require a formal review of the cost-
effectiveness of a new drug as a condition of reimbursement by national health systems; in 
other countries, such data are used as input to price negotiations. For example, in 1999 the UK 
established the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) to review the efficacy and cost 
of technologies expected to have major health or budgetary impact, including drugs, relative to 
current treatment, using standard metrics of the cost per quality adjusted life year (QALY). Cost 
reflects not only the price of the drug but also associated medical costs, such as reduced 
inpatient days or doctor visits. A similar expert body to review clinical effectiveness and now 
cost-effectiveness was established in Germany in 2004, and others are under debate in some 
other EU countries and in the US. Regulating prices indirectly through a review of cost- 
effectiveness is in theory more consistent with principles of efficient resource allocation than 
the other criteria for regulating drug prices reviewed here. In practice, such approaches are only 
as sound as the data and judgment used in implementation, of course. Still, the rapidly growing 
body of methodological and empirical literature on the measurement of cost-effectiveness offers 
some hope that this approach could provide one cornerstone to a more theoretically sound 
framework for drug price regulation.  
 
4. Effects of Regulation on Prices 
Cross-national comparisons of drug prices vary significantly, depending on the time   63
period, sample of drugs used, the price index methodology used, including unit for measuring 
price (grams, units, daily doses), consumption weights and exchange rates. Most price 
comparisons have been biased by use of very small, non-random samples including only 
branded drugs, and have not adhered to standard index number methods (for example, GAO, 
1992, 1994). The exclusive focus on branded drugs tends to bias comparisons in favor of 
countries with strict price regulation. Regulation and competition are to some degree 
substitutes: less regulated markets tend to have higher brand prices but larger generic market 
shares and lower priced generics. Overall, countries that use direct price controls do not 
consistently have lower prices than countries that use other indirect means to constrain prices 
(Danzon and Chao, 2000a, b; Danzon and Furukawa, 2003, 2006). However, comparisons are 
very sensitive to the sample of drugs, weights, exchange rate and prices used.  
 
5. Price Regulation: Lessons Learned and Future research    
The research of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s focused on effects of regulation of 
market access, focusing more on measuring the costs of launch delay, with less success in 
measuring any benefits from reduced risks or more appropriate drug use. In the 1990s 
regulatory change has focused on the design of price regulatory systems, first to control prices 
and subsequently to control total drug spending, while preserving access for patients and 
incentives for R&D. Although much useful research has been done, there remain many 
unanswered questions on the optimal design of insurance and price regulatory systems to 
achieve appropriate use of existing drugs and prices that strike a reasonable balance between 
short run spending control and incentives for R&D for the future. Garber et al. (2006) consider 
the interaction between health insurance, patents, incentives for R&D and regulation.    64
Useful lessons have been learned on the specific effects of different regulatory strategies 
but many unanswered questions remain. The evidence on Germany’s 1993 drug budget shows 
that placing physicians at financial risk is a potent weapon to limit drug spending. But an 
aggregate drug budget borne collectively by all physicians is contentious and ungrounded in 
welfare theory and Germany abandoned its drug budget in 2003. Physician-specific budgets 
provide stronger incentives but this may lead to undesirable cream-skimming if budget 
parameters cannot be appropriately risk-adjusted to reflect differences in patient characteristics. 
“Silo budgeting” which specific spending limits on individual medical services – drugs, 
hospitals, physicians – creates perverse incentives for cost shifting between the budgets, 
whereas cost-effective substitution between medical services is essential to achieve the 
maximum value from total health expenditures. Designing appropriate physician risk-sharing 
for drugs is an important issue for future research. 
In theory, reimbursement limits that are based on cost-effectiveness offer more efficient 
incentives for R&D and for drug choices than price regulation using ad hoc internal 
benchmarking or reference price reimbursement. Under CE, more effective/safer drugs can 
charger higher prices and still be cost-effective relative to less effective/ less safe drugs. 
Moreover, if costs and effects are measured using appropriate guidelines, decisions can in 
theory reflect all relevant social costs and benefits and be more consistent across drugs than is 
likely with ad hoc price regulation. More appropriate regulatory mechanisms for reviewing 
prices could provide better incentives for both R&D and for prescribing.  
Although CE offers a more appropriate criterion for drug price review than other widely 
used criteria, important details remain unresolved. One concern is that the data available for 
evaluating cost-effectiveness at launch are based on controlled, pre-launch clinical trials, which   65
may not accurately reflect the costs or effects of a drug in actual usage in broad patient 
populations. Updating the CE analysis with post-launch data from actual use is possible in 
principle; however, it is costly, is potentially less accurate due to non-random treatment 
assignments, and canceling reimbursement of a drug post-launch may be politically difficult. 
Nevertheless, integrating pre- and post-launch data is likely to become the norm as databases 
and statistical techniques improve. A second limitation of cost-effectiveness analysis is that it 
yields a ceiling or maximum price at which a drug is cost-effective, for a payer-specific CE 
threshold; however, CE alone does not yield the most appropriate price, because the drug would 
be even more cost-effective at a lower price. Thus although review of cost-effectiveness is 
becoming a necessary condition for reimbursement in an increasing number of countries  -- and 
the US Medicare drug benefit may eventually follow --  CE evaluation has supplemented but 
not replaced other price and expenditure regulation in countries that seek to control drug 
spending.  
 
6. Profitability and Rates of Return 
The pharmaceutical industry is widely perceived to earn excessive profits. Accurate 
measurement of profits using standard accounting data is problematic for pharmaceuticals 
because capital investments are primarily intangible R&D investments made over 12+ years 
prior to drug launch, with value over a product life of 10-15 years in global markets. Several 
methods have been used to measure profitability. One approach attempts to adjust accounting 
rates of return to better account for investments in intangible capital of R&D and promotion. 
Standard accounting practices treat R&D and promotion spending as current expenses rather 
than as investments in intangible capital. This leads to upward bias in accounting rates of return   66
for industries with relatively high intangible investments. Clarkson (1996) illustrates the effects 
of these adjustments for firms in fourteen industries for the period 1980-1993. Before 
adjustment, the average accounting rate of return on equity for the fourteen industries is 12.3 
percent; the pharmaceutical industry has the highest return of 24.4 percent. After adjustment for 
intangible capital, the average is 10.2 percent compared to 13.3 percent for pharmaceuticals, 
which is less than the adjusted return for petroleum, computer software and foods. 
A second approach uses the Lerner index of price relative to marginal production cost. 
Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) estimate the ratio of the price of originator drugs relative 
to generic price several years after patent (a proxy for marginal cost) at roughly 5. However, 
this price ratio at patent expiry overstates the average Lerner index over the life-cycle in the US 
because prices of originator drugs rise and marginal costs decline with time since launch. More 
fundamentally, a one-year Lerner index based on short-run marginal production cost in one 
country is both theoretically and empirically inadequate as a measure of profit for global 
products with high and long-lived R&D investments.  
A third – and conceptually more correct approach -- measures the rate of return on 
investment in a cohort of drugs, using discounted cash flow estimates of costs and returns. 
Grabowski and Vernon (1990, 1996, 2002) estimate the return on R&D for new drugs 
introduced in the 1970s, early 1980s and 1990s, respectively. Market sales data for the US are 
used to estimate a 20-year sales profile, with extrapolation to global sales using a foreign sales 
multiplier. Applying a contribution margin to net out other, non-R&D costs yields a life-cycle 
profile for net revenue, which is discounted to present value at launch using the estimated real 
cost of capital (10 – 11 percent). This NPV of net revenues is compared to the estimated 
average capitalized cost of R&D per NCE, at launch. Grabowski and Vernon conclude that the   67
1970s drug cohort on average earned a return roughly equal to their cost of capital; the 1980s 
cohort on average yielded a positive net present value of $22.2m, or an internal rate of return of 
11.1 percent, compared to the 10.5 percent cost of capital. Similarly, results for the 1990s 
cohort show a small, positive excess return. Given the large number of assumption, confidence 
intervals are not reported. In all three time periods, the returns distribution is highly skewed, 
such that only the top 30 percent of drugs cover the average R&D cost. This extreme result 
would be mitigated if the distribution of revenues were compared to the distribution of R&D 
costs, rather than to a single mean R&D cost per NCE, but the overall result would remain. An 
important implication of this skewed distribution of returns is that regulatory strategies that 
target these ‘blockbuster’ drugs while on patent could significantly reduce expected average 
returns and hence reduce incentives for R&D. By contrast, a competitive regulatory 
environment that permits high prices for patented drugs but then promotes generic competition 
after patent expiry has a much less negative effect on incentives for R&D, because loss in sales 
revenue that occurs late in the product life is more heavily discounted.  
Although this cohort rate-of-return approach in theory provides the most accurate 
measure of returns to R&D, it is arguably of limited relevance for policy in an industry with low 
barriers but long lead times for entry and high unpredictability of science and market risk. In the 
absence of significant barriers to entry to R&D for new firms, if the expected return on R&D 
exceeded the cost of capital, competitive entry would occur until the excess expected profit is 
eliminated. Such competitive adjustments may not be instantaneous, due to risks and time lags 
in R&D, and the actual realization of returns may differ radically from that anticipated due to 
changes in market and regulatory conditions. But if the assumption of dynamic competition 
with free entry is correct – and all the evidence suggests that it is – then if analysts were to   68
estimate that returns either exceeded or fell short of the cost of capital over a particular time 
period, this would either reflect measurement error or market disequilibrium that will be 
corrected by competitive entry, rendering the analyst’s estimate obsolete.   
Since the evidence indicates extensive competitive entry to exploit R&D opportunities 
and hence that dynamic competition should reduce expected profits to competitive levels, the 
more important policy question is whether the resulting rate of R&D yields a level and mix of 
new drugs that is socially optimal. In this model, changes in the regulatory and reimbursement 
environment may affect profitability in the short run. But in the long run, the rate and mix of 
R&D readjusts such that normal returns are realized on average. Whether the resulting R&D 
expenditures entail significant duplicative investment is an important issue. Henderson and 
Cockburn (1996) provide some evidence against this hypothesis, but not a definitive rejection. 
The current trend of payers to demand evidence of cost-effectiveness relative to existing drugs 
as a condition for reimbursement, reinforces incentives for manufacturers to target R&D 
towards innovative therapies and away from imitative drugs. The great ex ante uncertainty as to 
the ultimate therapeutic value and timing of new drugs implies that ex post realizations will still 
yield some “me-too” drugs. Even the optimal number of me-toos is uncertain, given their value 
as a competitive constraint and in improving therapies for some subsets of patients. Although 
product differentiation can be excessive in models of monopolistic competition or oligopoly, in 
the pharmaceutical industry any such excess more likely results from generous insurance 
coverage and high reimbursed prices, rather than firm strategies to use endogenous investments 
in R&D or marketing as an (unsuccessful) entry barrier.  
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7. Industry Structure and Productivity: Regulation or Technology? 
Several studies have examined the effects of regulation and other factors on industry 
structure. Grabowski (1976) and Grabowski and Vernon (1978) suggest that regulation-induced 
increases in R&D cost and risk created scale economies that resulted in the concentration of 
innovation in large firms. Temin (1979) analyzed the impact of regulatory and technological 
change on the structure of the US pharmaceutical industry from 1948 to 1973. He concludes 
that the size of drug firms increased dramatically during this period with much of the growth 
concentrated in large firms. Thomas (1990) shows that the decline in NCE introductions around 
1962 was concentrated in the smallest firms, many of which ceased R&D. Thomas (1996) 
extends the argument that strict safety and efficacy regulation in the US and UK led to a 
shakeout of smaller, less innovative firms and concentration of innovative effort in larger firms.  
However, since the 1980s and 1990s the biotechnology and genomics revolutions appear 
to have eliminated the advantages of size, at least for drug discovery, and this has dramatically 
changed the structure of the pharmaceutical-biotechnology industry. Previously, the chemistry 
basis of drug discovery implied an advantage for large firms that had large proprietary libraries 
of compounds, often created by their in-house chemists. Now, the basis for drug discovery has 
shifted to micro-biology and associated sciences, with comparative advantage in smaller firms 
that are often spun out from academic research centers. Large firms have continued to grow 
larger, mostly by acquiring other large firms in horizontal mergers or acquiring biotechnology 
companies or inlicensing their compounds, in quasi-vertical acquisitions. However, even the 
largest manufacturer (Pfizer, by global revenues in 2004) accounted for only about 10% of total 
sales. The FTC monitors the effect of mergers on competition within therapeutic categories, 
requiring merging firms to divest overlapping products if concentration would be unacceptably   70
high.  
Although firms have often rationalized their horizontal mergers on grounds of 
economies of scale and scope in R&D, the empirical evidence does not support the claims 
(Danzon, Epstein and Nicholson, 2005) and in fact R&D productivity of large firms has 
declined relative to smaller firms. A growing share of new drug approvals is originated by 
smaller firms, including not only biologics but also some chemistry-based drugs. Conversely, 
large firms rely increasingly on in-licensing – both research tools and target compounds - from 
smaller firms. Initially these start-up small firms specialize in discovery research, sometimes 
forming alliances with larger firms that provide funding and expertise for late-stage clinical 
trials and marketing, where experience and size play a greater role (Danzon, Nicholson and 
Pereira, 2005). The growth of contract research, sales and manufacturing organizations has 
increased the outsourcing opportunities for small firms and hence reduced their need to rely on 
larger, more experienced partners. Many small firms also purchase human capital expertise, by 
hiring experienced personnel from larger firms. A growing the number of biotechnology firms 
have fully integrated capabilities, with Genentech and Amgen being the most successful. Thus 
if, as earlier studies suggest, the 1962 regulatory changes did contribute to increased industry 
concentration and disadvantage small firms, the regulatory changes of the 1990s do not appear 
to have harmed small firms, and technological change has certainly benefited them. Moreover, 
competition for promising products developed by smaller discovery firms is strong and prices 
paid for such products have risen over the last decade, reflecting the shifting of bargaining 
power from large to smaller firms (Longman 2004; Longman 2006).   
It might be argued that the high rate of new start-ups in this industry reflects excessive 
entry as firms compete for profits in a differentiated products oligopoly, that such entry is   71
welfare reducing due to the repeated initial costs associated with achieving reasonable scale. 
However, the great majority of new start-ups are formed around new technologies, which face 
great scientific uncertainty that can only resolved by preclinical and clinical testing that takes 
time. The rate of discovery of new technologies is driven in part by NIH funding of basic 
research and the incentives under the Bayh Dole Act (1980) to commercialize such research, 
and possibly by favorable tax treatment of R&D, especially for orphan drugs. Whether or not 
NIH funding to basic research is excessive or suboptimal is an important subject for research. 
Thus in the current environment it does not appear that regulation of market access or 
endogenous investments in sunk R&D costs are major contributors to excessive product 
differentiation or monopoly power, with the possible exception of orphan drugs that by design 
receive five years of market exclusivity.  
However, it is plausible that health insurance coverage for modestly differentiated on-
patent drugs, when cheap generics are available for off-patent, therapeutic substitutes, 
contributes to product differentiation through slightly differentiated molecules and new 
formulations. Whether insurance creates incentives for excessive product differentiation, 
including extensions and new formulations, and/or reduces cross-price demand elasticities is an 
important subject for future research.  
 
VI. Promotion 
1. Trends in Promotion 
Promotion by manufacturers is an important mechanism whereby physicians, consumers 
and payers learn about drugs.  In 2003 the industry spent $25.3 billion on promotion or 17.1% 
of sales– similar to several other experience-good industries with significant product   72
differentiation such as toys and cosmetics (Frank RG 2002; Berndt 2005).
23 This estimate of 
total promotion spending omits the promotion-related components of pre- and post-launch 
clinical trials. On the other hand, the estimate is upward biased because almost two-thirds 
($16.3 billion) reflects free samples distributed to physicians for patient use (Berndt 2005), and 
these samples are valued at either a list price or a retail price that significantly exceeds the 
economic cost to manufacturers.
24 The next largest components of promotional spending were 
physician detailing ($4.5 billion), direct to consumer advertising ($3.7 billion), hospital 
detailing ($819 million) and medical journal advertising ($448 million) (Berndt 2005).    
Promotional spending overall has grown absolutely and as a percent of sales, from 
14.1% in 1996 to 17.1% in 2003. Direct to consumer advertising (DTCA) grew most rapidly, 
from just $12 million in 1989 and $791M. in 1996 –prior to the 1997 FDA reinterpretation of 
the guidelines for broadcast DTCA -- to $3.2 billion in 2003 (Palumbo FB 2002; Berndt 2005). 
The 1997 FDA Guidance clearly increased the share of DTCA that is broadcast, from under 30 
percent prior to 1997 to almost two-thirds in 2002 (Rosenthal MB 2002). DTCA is concentrated 
on the leading drugs in therapeutic categories that are particularly amenable to patient 
awareness and choice. For example, in the first six months of 2004 spending for the top 20 
drugs accounted for 65.1% of all DTCA. The top five therapeutic categories for DTCA in 2000 
were antidepressants, antihistamines, antihyperlipidemics, nasal sprays and proton pump 
inhibitors (Rosenthal MB 2002; Berndt 2005).  
 
2. Regulation of Promotion: Background and Issues 
As discussed in Section II, promotion of prescription drugs in the US has been regulated 
by the FDA since the 1962 Amendments, which remains the statutory base guiding the FDA’s   73
regulation of promotion to both physicians and consumers. This statute restricts promotional 
claims to facts established in clinical trials; requires that risks as well as benefits be described in 
brief summary; and excludes promotion of unapproved indications. The FDA’s 1997 Guidance 
relaxed the requirement that the full product label, which includes all known risks, be displayed 
in broadcast ads. Rather, the requirement for a brief summary of risks and benefits could be 
provided by giving a website, a toll free number, or reference to a print ad with the full label, in 
addition to advice to “see your physician.” These changes were deemed to reflect the ways in 
which consumers currently get information.  
The US constitutional right to freedom of speech has been interpreted to include 
commercial speech and hence to support limits on regulation of promotion by the FDA. The 
FDA cannot require pre-clearance of ads; however, once they appear the FDA can require 
changes, removal and even dissemination of corrective information. Promotion of information 
about off-label (unapproved) uses of drugs was not permitted until 1997, when companies were 
permitted to disseminate peer reviewed publications discussing off-label use. In its oversight of 
promotion, as for its other activities, the FDA is required by statute to consider risks and 
benefits; costs are not mentioned. Thus the FDA is concerned with the effects of promotion on 
patients and physicians; whether or not it results in unnecessary costs is beyond its purview.  
 
3. Evidence on Effects of Pharmaceutical Promotion 
The pharmaceutical industry’s large expenditure on advertising is controversial, with 
policy concern over both magnitude and form. The economic literature outlines the issues and 
provides some evidence, but basic questions remain unresolved. The growth of DTCA since 
1997, in particular, has prompted research to better understand its effects. The economic   74
rationale for promotion is that it provides information to physicians and consumers about the 
benefits and risks of drugs, which is necessary for appropriate prescribing and to encourage 
appropriate patient compliance. Critics contend that much promotional expenditure is in fact 
designed to persuade rather than inform; that it increases product differentiation, brand loyalty, 
market power and prices; and that it leads to inappropriate use, including use of high-price, on-
patent drugs when cheap generics would be equally effective.  
Promotion studies pre-1997   An early proponent of the anti-competitive hypothesis, 
Walker (1971) argues that large promotion expenditures raise entry barriers and increase market 
power, by requiring new entrants to make large outlays in order to attract attention to new 
products. The alternative view is that advertising may enhance competition by facilitating the 
introduction of new products and new firms. Schwartzman (1975) finds that more innovative 
firms spend larger sums on promotion.  Telser (1975) finds that the extent of new entry into a 
therapeutic class is positively related to promotional intensity. However, it is unclear whether 
this positive correlation indicates that promotion enhances competitive entry or whether both 
are simply related to unobservable factors such as technological advance and market potential.  
Leffler (1981) estimates a model across therapeutic categories with selling effort as the 
dependent variable and the number of new products introduced as the primary explanatory 
variable. He finds a significant positive effect which he interprets as suggesting that 
pharmaceutical advertising is at least partly informative. He also finds evidence, however, that 
advertising of established pharmaceutical products accomplishes ‘reminder’ and ‘habit-
formation’ purposes. These results suggest that the impact of advertising is multidimensional 
and that the net effect on competition may differ, depending on the circumstances.  The 
distinction drawn by Leffler between the ‘persuasion’ and ‘information’ roles of pharmaceutical   75
promotion is extended and supported by Hurwitz and Caves (1988). Berndt et al. (1995) find 
that promotional stocks of detailing, journal advertising and DTCA (pre-1997) significantly 
affect industry-level demand for anti-ulcerants but with diminishing returns, again suggesting 
the importance of reminder or loyalty-building promotion.  
Beales (1996) uses the FDA policy restricting manufacturer advertising of unapproved 
indications as a natural experiment to test the importance of pharmaceutical marketing as a 
source of information for physicians. He analyzes the impact of promotional activity following 
FDA approval of second indications for existing drugs on the share of patients treated with the 
newly approved product, the total fraction of patients treated with drug therapy, and the average 
price level. He finds some evidence that seller provided information after approval results in 
increased market share for the new indication as well as lower average price per prescription of 
other products in the market, suggesting an increase in consumer benefits from increased 
manufacturer-provided information. However, identifying the impact of FDA approval itself vs. 
promotional expenditures is problematic.  
Effects of direct to consumer advertising post-1997  Much of the analysis of DTCA has 
focused on its effects on drug sales in aggregate and on share of the individual brand. Although 
some of these studies use state-of-the-art methods, applied to the best data available and provide 
valuable evidence, important issues remain unresolved. This reflects both data and empirical 
challenges and the difficulty of weighing costs and benefits to drawing overall welfare 
conclusions.  
One major empirical challenge is that DTCA is endogenously determined and just one 
of several types of a promotion a firm may use. Ignoring the endogeneity of DTCA and its 
correlation with other (often unobserved) forms of promotion can potentially lead to serious   76
biases in results. For example, both theory and evidence suggest that DTCA is likely to have a 
higher pay-off for best-in-class drugs. This assumes that physicians, as good agents, are more 
likely to write the prescription for the best-in-class product, even if the patient requests another 
advertised brand. In that case, an observed positive correlation between promotion and market 
share may reflect in part these incentives for market leaders to invest more in promotion, 
leading to upward biased estimates of the reverse effect of promotion on market share. Second, 
estimates of promotional effects must take into account lagged and future impact on 
information stocks, as physicians form prescribing habits and patients tend to stay with a 
particular brand for chronic medications, once they have found a drug that works for them. 
Third, the net effect of one firm’s promotion depends on competitors’ strategic responses. 
Finally, drawing welfare conclusions from the empirical evidence is particularly 
problematic. The economic/marketing literature generally views advertising that expands 
aggregate category sales as more likely to be informative, and hence welfare-enhancing, 
whereas advertising that simply changes market shares without affecting aggregate use is more 
likely to be wasteful (for a discussion see Berndt, 2005; Kravitz, 2005).  However, in the case 
of heavily insured pharmaceuticals, for which consumers pay only a small fraction of the cost 
out-of-pocket, it is possible that even category-expanding effects could reflect unnecessary use 
(and/or unnecessarily costly use), even though such purchases are well-informed and rational 
for individual consumers, given their insurance coverage. With these caveats, the main findings 
from the recent literature are reviewed here (for a more detailed review, see Berndt, 2005).  
The study of promotional effects in the antihistamine and antiviral categories by 
Narayan et al. (2005) is unusual in including data on DTCA, detailing, pricing, and other 
medical spending as alternative marketing mechanisms to influence sales;  measuring both the   77
short and long run effects of promotion; and estimating cross-firm elasticities. All marketing 
mix variables are modeled as endogenous. This study finds that, of the four marketing variables, 
only DTCA has a positive but small effect on aggregate category sales. Each product’s own 
DTCA also positively affects its own brand sales, but interaction effects with other brands’ 
DTCA are negative. Own DTCA and detailing appear to be complements, rather than 
substitutes. The estimated return on investment is lower for DTCA than for detailing, 
suggesting that firms might gain by reallocating marketing budgets away from DTCA and 
towards detailing. Although it would be a mistake to generalize the findings of this study, which 
focused on only two therapeutic categories, it does illustrate the importance of including the full 
marketing mix and controlling for endogeneity of the marketing variables when estimating the 
effects of DTCA.
25 
In general, with the important exception of the Narayan et al. (2005) paper cited above, 
findings from other studies suggest that DTCA has a greater effect on category sales than on 
individual brand sales. Rosenthal et al. (2003) use data for five large therapeutic categories to 
estimate effects of DTCA, controlling for sampling and detailing.(Rosenthal MB 2003)  They 
conclude that DTCA has a significant positive impact on class sales, with an average elasticity 
of roughly .1, but they find no evidence that detailing or DTCA has a significant effect on 
product-specific market shares.
26 The authors emphasize that failure to find brand-specific 
effects could reflect learning or unmeasured longer term effects. Wosinska (2002) finds that 
DTCA for the cholesterol reducing medications (statins) positively affects brand share only if 
the brand had preferred formulary status.(Wosinska 2002) Similarly, Iizuka and Jin (2005b) 
find that DTCA increases total category sales, but brand-specific share is only significantly 
shifted by physician promotion such as detailing and journal publications. The authors conclude   78
that a product should hold at least 58% market share of its therapeutic category sales in order to 
recoup DTCA investment.  In fact, they find that 69% of DTCA spending is on drugs with at 
least a 60% market share. They also find that DTCA increases the number of doctor visits at 
which a drug is prescribed (Iizuka and Jin, 2005a), with some differences between patient types 
in their responsiveness to DTCA (young vs. elderly; private vs. public insurance).  Donohue 
and Berndt (2004) find that DTCA has no significant effect on choice of product, but that it 
does motivate individuals to visit the physician.  
A randomized control trial by Kravitz et al. (2005) supports the ambiguous conclusions 
reached in other studies that use observational data on medical.  Standardized patients (who 
were not sick, but were scripted with dialog to feign depression or adjustment disorder) asked 
unsuspecting blinded physicians for either A) no medication B) a generic drug or C) a specific 
brand.  For both disorders those who requested were significantly more likely to receive a drug 
(31% vs 76% vs 53% for depression, 10% vs. 39% vs. 55% for adjustment disorder), but not 
necessarily the suggested drug (in the case of those who requested one). Various conclusions 
can be drawn from these data, including that there is both over and undertreatment of 
depression, and that responses to patient requests differ across physicians. Policy implications 
for DTCA regulation are therefore very unclear. Moreover, welfare conclusions would also 
require data on costs and medical outcomes.  
  The effects of DTCA on quality of care and patients’ compliance with prescribed 
regimens are examined by Donohue (2004) and Wosinska (2004). Donohue (2003) finds that 
patients in the top quartile of exposure to DTCA had 32% higher odds of initiating therapy.  
Conditional on any therapy, those in the top quartile of DTCA spending also had a 30% (p<.05) 
greater probability of adherence (measured as filling at least 4 prescriptions over the first six   79
months of therapy). Wosinska’s examination of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield of California 
data for adherence to statin regimes finds a minor impact for total DTCA spending, but current 
and lagged own DTCA has no affect on product adherence (Wosinska 2004).     
  Iizuka (2004) finds that high quality drugs, as defined by whether a drug had “priority” 
status for FDA approval, have significantly more DTCA spending. The interaction term 
between the quality dummy variable and a dummy variable indicating that the drug was either 
first or second to market within a particular class also had positive significance. He also finds 
that DTCA spending decisions are significantly related to the potential market size but not the 
currently treated market size—a result which supports the hypothesis that DTCA has positive 
social value in that it targets consumers might potentially benefit from medicines rather than 
those who already take medicines.   
   
4. International Regulation of Promotion  
Several countries include in their price regulation systems features that are designed to 
discourage promotion. The UK PPRS limits the promotional expenditure that can be deducted 
as a cost in calculating the net rate of return. Germany’s 1993 German global drug budget 
legislation placed the pharmaceutical industry at financial risk for budget overruns, second in 
line after physicians, in order to discourage promotion. Similarly, France penalizes “excessive” 
promotion, both directly through fines for exceeding allowed promotion limits and indirectly 
through penalties for overshooting target sales limits. Some countries prohibit samples; even 
where there is no prohibition, there may be little incentive to give free samples in countries 
where patient co-payments are low.      80
Most countries restrict DTCA to so-called “help seeking” ads, which inform consumers 
about a specific health condition and the availability of treatment for that condition. The only 
other country that permits DTCA that names a specific product to treat a condition is New 
Zealand. New Zealand has a strict freedom of commercial speech commitment and it has no 
constraining statute that requires DTCA to present a “fair balance” between risks and benefits. 
Survey results indicate the between 82-90% of individuals recall benefits information in DTCA 
in both the US and New Zealand, but only 20-27% recall risk information in New Zealand 
compared to 81-89% recall for risks in the US (Hoek J 2004).     
Studies of regulatory systems and their effects are more limited for promotion than for 
prices, in part because data on promotion spending is more limited and less informative across 
countries. For example, the content of a visit by a detail representative to a physician can be 
very different, depending on time spent, messaging allowed, whether sampling is permitted etc. 
Berndt, Danzon and Kruse (2006, forthcoming) provides some evidence on cross-national 
differences in promotion and in diffusion of new drugs.   
 
5. Promotion to Managed Care 
  The growth of managed care has fundamentally changed the nature of marketing of 
pharmaceuticals. The autonomy of the physician has been reduced, with power shifting to 
payers or their pharmaceutical and therapeutics committees that make formulary decisions, in 
addition to consumers. This shift in the primary ‘customer’ from the physician to more cost-
conscious decision makers has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in the importance of 
cost-effectiveness analysis, to demonstrate that a particular drug is more cost-effective than the   81
alternatives. Use of cost-effectiveness analysis by managed care organizations is summarized in 
Elixhauser, Luce and Steiner (1995) and Newman (2004).  
In response to this trend, the FDA proposed regulations that would require that a 
pharmaceutical firm’s cost-effectiveness claims be supported by ‘sound’ analysis. A debate 
ensued as to whether this requirement requires a double blind, randomized clinical trial (RCT) 
between the two drugs under comparison. Such a requirement would raise the same issues that 
were debated at the time of the 1962 Amendments: are the gains from reducing the risk of 
misleading claims outweighed by the costs of additional clinical trials? The social value of 
head-to-head RCTs as a requirement for cost-effectiveness claims is weaker than the case for 
RCTs for efficacy prior to launch, in part because the information on both costs and effects 
produced in RCTs is not necessarily an accurate measure of cost-effectiveness in actual use, 
because trials do not mirror actual practice. Moreover, for firms considering investing in such 
trials, the payoff diminishes as patent expiry approaches and the risks could be significant, if 
negative findings must be publicized. So far the FDA regulations fall short of requiring RCTs to 
support economic claims. Some managed care firms require that studies submitted to support 
marketing claims follow specified guidelines, including comparison of any new treatment with 
the standard of care for their patient population. If CMS develops guidelines for effectiveness 
studies for the Medicare Drug Benefit, the private sector may choose to free ride, in which case 
the government guidelines may de facto acquire the status of regulation for the conduct of cost-
effectiveness studies and, potentially, for decisions on reimbursement.  
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6. Discussion of Promotion  
Some of the effects of DTCA appear consistent with social welfare, while other 
evidence suggests some inappropriate effects. Given other evidence that there is both under and 
overuse of pharmaceuticals, relative to medical guidelines, it is not surprising that drawing 
welfare conclusions on effects of DTCA and of DTCA regulation is problematic. Moreover, the 
real policy decisions in the US are less about whether DTCA should be permitted but about the 
specific details of appropriate regulatory rules that may be too nuanced for empirical analysis.  
Moreover, the effects of regulation depend not only on the rules but on enforcement.  
The staffing levels at the FDA’s division of drug advertising, marketing and communications 
(DDMAC) are reportedly inadequate for the amount of material they must review, including 
television and print advertising (GAO 2002).   The HHS policy since 2001 to review warning 
letters from the DDMAC has further inhibited enforcement (Gahart, Duhamel et al. 2003).  
While firms have generally complied with warning letters for infractions and no major 
disciplinary action has been required, in some instances multiple letters have been sent and the 
delay in enforcement may have effectively allowed commercials to influence public opinion 
before modification or withdrawal.   
The recent withdrawals of widely advertised products and of some widely disseminated 
ads have prompted both the FDA and industry to address their policies related to DTCA 
(Dubois 2003).  Industry has issued voluntary guidelines for DTCA which reinforce the “fair 
balance” standard and stipulate that firms provide copy of advertisements prior to, rather than 
concurrent with, planned public release(PhRMA 2005(b)).  The guidelines also call for firms to 
abstain from DTCA for several months after launch of a new drug, in part to enable education 
of physicians about new products in advance of DTCA release.      83
VIII. Conclusions  
Regulation of pharmaceuticals derives from intrinsic product characteristics, in 
particular, significant but uncertain risks and benefits to health, rather than to structural 
features of the industry, such as natural monopoly. Information about a drug’s risks and 
benefits in humans can only be obtained from careful study in large numbers of patients with 
appropriate controls for patient characteristics and co-morbidities. There is a strong argument 
that structuring and interpreting such data analysis is a public good that is best delivered by an 
expert regulatory agency. The existence of regulatory systems to perform these functions and 
control market access in all industrialized and most developing countries is strong evidence 
for consensus opinion on this basic proposition. However, the regulatory details of what 
information to gather, whether relative to placebo or current treatment, from pre-launch or 
post-launch sources, and under what conditions to make a drug available to the public, raise 
questions of effects of different regulatory regimes and optimal regulatory structure. 
Economic analysis has shed considerable light on these issues, but many fundamental 
questions remain. Moreover, since the fundamental problem is imperfect information, the 
optimal regulatory structure may change over time, as technologies for data gathering and 
analysis change and consumers’ willingness to bear risk and demand for information change 
with technology, income and other factors.  
  Early research on the 1962 Keffauver-Harris Amendments strongly suggests that it 
was one – but not the only – factor contributing to rising costs of R&D, reduction in number 
of new drugs and probably reduced market share for small firms. However, the evidence from 
the 1990s and 2000s suggest that, while some regulatory changes accelerated the review 
process and stimulated R&D for diseases with smaller market size, rising concern over drug   84
risks contributed to rising R&D costs. At the same time, the biotechnology and genomics 
revolutions have transformed drug discovery and transformed industry structure, with 
biologics accounting for an increasing share of sales and a rapidly growing share of new drugs 
in the pipeline. Thus regulation no longer appears to play a significant role in the size 
distribution of firms.  
In contrast to the evidence on costs and delay, the debate over appropriate minimum 
standards for safety and efficacy and the optimal trade-off between them has generated more 
heat than light. Important topics for future research include the political economy questions, 
to shed light on economic reasons for the changes over time in FDA policy, and standard 
economic analysis of effects of various alternatives. Some advocate greater disclosure of all 
clinical trial results and stricter requirement for safety and efficacy relative to current standard 
of care, via larger trials and mandated registration of both pre-approval and post-marketing 
trials in publicly available registries, while others assert that greater autonomy of patients and 
physicians to select drugs which meet minimal safety standards would offer expanded choice 
and potentially increase net welfare. While the methodology of cost-effectiveness analysis has 
become increasingly sophisticated for use in reimbursement decisions, little progress has been 
made on the application of such concepts or other formal decision analytic tools to the 
weighing risks and benefits in drug approval decisions, or determining optimal thresholds for 
safety and efficacy. 
Another important topic for future research involves identifying best practices and best 
data sources for integrating post-launch observational data with pre-launch clinical trial data, 
to evaluate safety and efficacy decisions on an ongoing basis as information accumulates. An 
important related question will be the effect of post-launch drug evaluation on costs and ex   85
ante risks and returns to firms, and hence on firm R&D investment decisions. Optimal 
integration of post-launch regulatory review with tort liability is a related issue. 
  The interface between patents and regulation is another important topic on which 
economic research has shed some light but many interesting questions remain. Although 
pharmaceuticals are subject to the same 20 year patent life as other products, effective patent 
life depends on regulation. FDA requirements for proof of safety and efficacy truncate early 
product life, but regulation also restores patent term and grants additional market exclusivities 
for new formulations, pediatric indications etc. Most important, regulatory requirements for 
market access of generics effectively define the end of patent life for originator products. 
Litigation between generic and originator firms has proliferated in recent years, indicating 
considerable uncertainty about patent validity and/or perverse incentives for strategic patent 
filing and patent challenges. More research is needed on how far new formulations and new 
indications for established drugs add to consumer welfare vs. serve as mechanisms for 
“evergreening” the original patent. Such research could be useful input into regulation and 
patent provisions for these follow-on products and could inform antitrust activity towards 
settlements between originator and generics firms. Clearer standards for patents could in turn 
help reduce wasteful litigation.  
Defining appropriate regulatory provisions for approval of generic biologics is partly a 
scientific question but with important potential for economic impact. The regulatory details 
must consider safety and efficacy and the need to avoid biasing R&D incentives for or against 
biologics vs. chemical drugs. Moreover, the extent to which price competition occurs between 
similar biologic products will depend on reimbursement provisions and incentives for 
physicians who typically dispense these drugs. Reimbursement for physician-dispensed drugs   86
is in flux and current models have perverse incentives (Danzon, Wilensky and Means, 2005). 
Resolving these issues is essential if consumers and payers are to realize the potential for 
savings from generic biologics.  
Regulation of price and reimbursement for pharmaceuticals differs from price 
regulation in other industries in that the rationale for regulation arises out of insurance and its 
effects on demand elasticity. Both private and public insurers adopt supply side policies, 
including limits on reimbursed prices, in order to control supplier pricing moral hazard, in 
addition to patient co-payments to control consumer moral hazard.  Price regulatory systems 
are generally an ad hoc mix of historical policies that have evolved over time as a trade-off 
between controlling drug spending and assuring access for patients. Because the details of 
each country’s system differ, attempts to measure effects of regulatory prototypes, such as 
“price controls” or “reference pricing” are fraught with confounding from other unmeasured 
country-specific details and non-regulatory factors. Moreover, effects on R&D are 
confounded by the fact that incentives for pharmaceutical R&D depend on global revenues. 
Nevertheless, understanding effects of different systems for controlling drug prices, 
reimbursement and expenditures is clearly an important subject for future research, including 
effects on prices, utilization, patient outcomes and firm R&D incentives. Such research is 
particularly important as some form of regulation becomes more likely in the US, as the 
federal government becomes a much larger purchaser of pharmaceuticals through the 
Medicare drug benefit, albeit so far through private administration.           
  Finally, regulation of promotion remains a relatively uncharted territory, with some 
useful studies but many remaining questions, particularly related to DTCA. Empirical issues 
are particularly challenging, given the number of promotional channels that are   87
simultaneously determined, and interdependence between firm strategies. The existing 
evidence on effects of DTCA is mixed, with quite strong evidence for category expansion and 
weaker evidence for improved compliance and product specific benefits. Effects on patient 
outcomes and on competition and overall costs have not been measured. Thus several of the 
components of a full welfare analysis remain to be developed.  
In summary, although there is a large and growing literature on regulation of the 
pharmaceutical industry that has produced valuable information and useful lessons learned, 
large and important issues remain for future research. Models of regulation in other industries 
are either not relevant or require significant adaptation and extension, in order to fit this 
industry’s peculiar characteristics --- in particular, high rates of R&D and technical change, 
with life-or-death effects, patents, insurance, and physicians, consumers, payers and 
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Table 1:  Objectives and Types of Regulation of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
Rationale for Regulation  Type of Regulation 
Imperfect information about drug 
safety and efficacy 
Market access requirements of safety, efficacy and 
quality  
Regulation of promotion  
Tort liability 
 
High fixed costs of R&D   Patents and regulation of generic entry  
Orphan Drug Act 
Accelerated approval measures  
 
Insurance-induced moral hazard   Regulation of prices, reimbursement, profits, 
expenditure/revenues  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 In theory, firms may submit for OTC (over-the-counter or non-prescription) status, but the 
new product would have to be proven safe and effective under self medication, which could 
be a higher bar since some consumers may not use the product appropriately (Mahinka SP and 
Bierman ME, 1995). In contrast to medicines, dietary supplements are regulated under the 
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994. Manufacturers of dietary supplements 
are responsible for assuring that their products are safe but they are not required to get FDA 
approval before marketing. However, they cannot make explicit health claims unless these 
claims have been demonstrated by clinical trials. The ability to make health claims and, most 
important, to be eligible for health insurance coverage probably makes prescription status the 
most attractive status, for any drug that (a) can potentially meet FDA standards for safety and 
efficacy and (b) is patentable and hence can expect to recoup the costs of clinical trials. 
 
2 This has subsequently been renewed twice as part of the Food and Drug Modernization Act 
(1997) and the Bioterrorism and Preparedness and Response Act (2002).   
 
3 The fee for review of data related to product approval  is $767,400 for applications with new 
clinical data, $383,700 for supplemental applications or those with no new clinical data (for 
fiscal year 2006).  There is also a fee for each manufacturing facility ($264,000) and an 
annual fee for the right to market products ($42,130). (FDA, 2005a)..   
 
4 The patent term restoration is 0.5 years per 1 year spent in clinical trials and 1-for-1 for 
years spent in regulatory review.    126
                                                                                                                                                          
 
5 Assuming that more important drugs typically have atypically high price or quantity, and 
therefore revenues, the percentage decline in revenue share of new drugs should be less than the 
percentage decline in number of new drugs, if the Amendments only eliminated minor drugs of 
dubious efficacy.  
 
6 Boston Consulting Group (BCG, 1993) reports that the mean number of subjects included in 
NDAs increased from 1576 for 1977–1980, to 1321 for 1981–1984, and 3233 for 1985–1988. 
DiMasi et al. (2003) report a mean number of subjects per NDA of 5,303 for trials completed 
in the late 1990s. DiMasi (2001) reports that total cumulative time from drug synthesis to 
approval increased from 8.1 years for 1963-1969 to 14.2 by 1990-1999.  
 
7 Finkelstein (2004) examines the effects on vaccine R&D of three plausibly exongeneous 
shifts in policy (the 1991 CDC recommendation to vaccinate infants against Hepatitis B, the 
1993 expansion of Medicare to cover influenza vaccines and the 1986 introduction of the 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Fund) that plausibly increased expected revenues. She finds a 
lagged increase in vaccine clinical trials after these events, but no increase in early stage 
patent activity or preclinical trials.     
 
8 Dranove and Meltzer (1994) used several measures of drug importance, including citations 
in medical textbooks, in medical journals, and in subsequent patent applications; the extent of 
worldwide introduction; and US sales. To the extent that these ex post measures of importance   127
                                                                                                                                                          
are noisy measures of ex ante forecasts of importance, their estimates of differential delay 
may be understated. 
 
9 DiMasi (2003) p.164-165 reports that total time from start of human testing to approval for a 
representative drug is 90.3 months in the 1990s, down from 98.9 in the 1980s.   
 
10 Post launch efficacy trials would be required with results posted on the internet, for 
consumers to make their own evaluations (Madden, 2004). 
 
11 Data from IMS Health, unpublished presentation. Note that these figures include only 
unbranded generics, which compete on price rather than brand image. Branded generics, 
which include some old single source drugs, account for an additional 9.8 percent of 
prescriptions and sales.  
 
12 See Article 31 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm3_e.htm 
 
13 For a discussion of these issues, see for example Danzon (1997), Dumoulin (2001), Jack 
and Lanjouw (2003), Malueg and Schwartz (1994), Maskus (2001), Danzon and Towse 
(2003, 2005), Scherer and Watal (2002). 
 
14 Institutional arrangements that facilitate differential pricing between the low and high 
income subgroups within developing countries may also be necessary. Without such   128
                                                                                                                                                          
segmentation, manufacturers may rationally choose a single price for a low-income country 
that is profit-maximizing given demand of the affluent minority of the population but is 
unaffordable for the lower-income majority.  
 
15 As a proxy for price to private payers, they use the average price paid by Medicaid, which 
is a percent of a list price. They report that, in a limited sample of drugs,  the log of this price 
is highly correlated with the log of a better measure of transactions price to private payers.  
 
16 Some insurers contract with PBMs as specialized intermediaries to manage their drug 
benefit, while other larger plans manage their own benefit using similar techniques.  Thus 
although PBMs are estimated to manage approximately 57 percent of the US population’s 
drug benefit (Health Strategies, 2005) the share of the population that has managed drug 
benefits, including HMOs and seniors under Medicare Part D, is probably over 70 percent.  
 
17 Although some countries, including Italy, have attempted to base prices on costs, this 
approach is not widely used because of the difficulty of obtaining accurate measurement of 
costs. Measuring R&D cost is particularly problematic, because it occurs over many years, 
includes the cost of failures and foregone interest, and is largely a joint cost that must be 
allocated across global markets. In practice, price regulation based on costs has relied on 
transfer pricing rules which were designed for tax purposes, not price regulation. 
18 Similar incentives existed in the US under Medicare B which, until 2005, paid for 
physician-dispensed drugs based on a percent of Average Wholesale Price (AWP). Since   129
                                                                                                                                                          
physicians captured the margin between AWP and their acquisition cost, manufacturers could 
increase physicians’ financial incentives by discounting the acquisition price.  
 
19 Thomas (1996) discusses other factors, including weak efficacy requirements for drug 
approval, that may have contributed to the relatively weak international competitiveness of 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry, compared to its prowess in other high technology industries.  
 
20 For analysis of differential pricing in the context of developing countries, see Danzon and 
Towse ( 2003, 2005); Jack and Lanjouw (2003). 
 
21 In Germany, pharmacies were required to dispense the brand prescribed by the physician 
and could substitute a generic only if the script was written by generic name. Until 2004, 
German pharmacies were paid a percentage of the price of the drug they dispensed, hence 
they had neither legal authority nor financial incentive to seek out cheaper generics. Not 
surprisingly, in this system generics competed on brand rather than price, and generic prices 
were relatively high, compared to US generic prices (Danzon and Furukawa, 2003). In 2006 
German sickfunds began contracting directly with generic suppliers in order to obtain lower 
generic prices. 
 
22Primary care physicians in the UK are organized into primary care groups, by locality. Each 
group must serve all residents in its area and receives a global budget for their costs. Thus 
spending more on drugs means less money for other services. Physicians are trained to   130
                                                                                                                                                          
prescribe generically and pharmacists in the UK can profit from substituting generics for 
brands, if the script is generically written.   
 
23 For 2003, the reported promotion spending in the US is less than the spending on R&D of 
$34.5 billion (PhRMA, 2005); however, this country-specific measure of R&D-to-sales is 
imprecise for multinational firms with global sales but R&D concentrated in at most a few 
countries. 
 
24 A more accurate measure of the true cost of samples to firms lies somewhere between the 
marginal production cost and the actual price the manufacturer might have received, had the 
patient filled the prescription and paid for the drug. 
 
25 Narayan et al. rely on three sets of instruments for price, DTCA and detailing.  Price is 
instrumented with the pharmaceutical PPI interacted with product dummy variables as well as 
lagged (3 years total) PPI interacted with product dummies (36 instruments for 12 product 
categories).  DTCA is instrumented with the PPI for television, radio and print advertising.  
Detailing was instrumented with employment data.   
 
26 Instruments include a quadratic of the drug’s remaining patent life, a post-1997 time trend 
and the monthly cost of TV advertising. 
 